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ABSTRACT
Power consumption has become a key issue for smartphone security and privacy
protection. In this dissertation, we propose to exploit power for smartphone
security, as well as to optimize energy consumption for smartphone privacy.
First, we show that public USB charging stations pose a significant privacy risk
to smartphone users. We present a side-channel attack that allows a charging
station to identify which webpages are loaded while the smartphone is charging.
To evaluate this side-channel, we collected power traces of Alexa top 50 websites
on multiple smartphones under several conditions, including: varied battery
charging level, browser cache enabled/disabled, taps/no taps on the screen,
WiFi/LTE, TLS encryption enabled/disabled, di↵erent amounts of time elapsed
between collection of training and testing data, and various hosting locations of
the website being visited. The results of our evaluation show that the attack is
highly successful: in many settings, we were able to achieve over 90% accuracy on
webpage identification. On the other hand, our experiments also show that this
side-channel is sensitive to some of the aforementioned conditions.
Second, we introduce a new attack that allows a malicious charging station to
identify which website is being visited by a smartphone user via Tor network.
Our attack solely depends on power measurements performed while the user is
charging her smartphone. We evaluated the attack by training a machine
learning model on power traces from 50 regular webpages and 50 Tor hidden
services. We considered realistic constraints such as di↵erent Tor circuits types
and battery charging levels. We were able to correctly identify webpages visited
using the o cial mobile Tor browser with accuracy of up to 85.7% when the
battery was fully charged, and up to 46% when the battery level was between
30% and 50%. Our results show that hidden services can be identified with
higher accuracies than regular webpages.
Third, we propose a memory- and energy-e cient garbled circuit evaluation
mechanism named MEG on smartphones. MEG utilizes batch data transmission
and multi-threading to reduce memory and energy consumption. We implement
MEG on Android smartphones and compare its performance with existing
methods (non-pipelined and pipelined). Two garbled circuits of di↵erent scales,
128-bit AES encryption (AES-128) and 256-bit Levenshtein distance (EDT-256),
are considered. Our measurement results show that compared with non-pipelined
method, MEG decreases the memory consumption by up to 97.5% for EDT-256
when batch size is 2 MB. Compared with pipelined method, MEG reduces the
energy consumption by up to 42% for AES-128 and 23% for EDT-256.
Multi-thread MEG also significantly decreases the circuit evaluation time by up
to 56.7% for AES-128 and up to 13.5% for EDT-256.
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Exploiting Power for Smartphone Security and Privacy
Chapter 1
Introduction
The extensive usage of smartphones brings increasing security and privacy risks for users.
Because of the mobility of their devices, smartphone users are susceptible to attacks at
many places, ranging from their homes to public areas. Smartphones also carry in-
creasingly sensitive contents, such as web browsing history, communication messages,
and financial transaction records. If such information leaks, the users will encounter
privacy invasions and even financial losses. As communication and sensor techniques ad-
vance, smartphones feature many connection interfaces integrated, such as USB, WiFi,
and NFC. Each interface is vulnerable to a breach caused by the exploitation of various
design errors or software bugs. Furthermore, because smartphones have di↵erent charac-
teristics from traditional computers, such as low CPU performance and limited battery
capacity, existing successful security and privacy protection techniques for computers
may not work on smartphones.
As users rely on smartphones for a variety of power-intensive activities, power con-
sumption has become a key issue for smartphone security and privacy protection. This
leads to two problems. The first problem is the risk of a power-based security attack. Be-
cause smartphones adopt aggressive dynamic power optimization techniques when run-
ning various apps, it is possible to infer user activity data based on power consumption
traces. The second problem is the energy e ciency of privacy protection. Existing pri-
vacy protection techniques, such as secure computation, incorporate complex functions
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that require huge computing capability and energy consumption. However, smartphone
memory, CPU, and battery capacities are limited and have not kept up with the increase
of complexity of privacy protection applications.
1.1 Problem Statements
In this dissertation, we propose how to exploit power for smartphone security, as well as
how to optimize energy consumption for smartphone privacy. Specifically, we work on
the following three problems.
(1) Inferring Browsing Activity on Smartphones via USB Power Analy-
sis Side-channel Users commonly rely on their smartphones for a variety of energy-
intensive activities such as video streaming, web browsing, connection sharing (hotspot),
gaming, and VoIP. As a consequence, recharging smartphones multiple times a day has
become common practice. A recent survey [1] found that users in the United States
charge their smartphones anywhere from 1.8 to 2.6 times a day on average. To address
users’ charging needs, USB charging stations (or kiosks) are becoming ubiquitous in
many public areas, including airports [2], parks [3, 4], hotels [5], and hospitals [6].
While charging stations undoubtedly provide convenience to smartphone users, they
also expose them to privacy threats. For example, in an attack called “juice-jacking”,
an untrusted charging station exfiltrates data by covertly setting the smartphone into
USB transfer mode [7]. To counter data exfiltration attacks, hardware devices such as
SyncStop [8] are designed to physically interrupt data wires at the USB port, thereby
blocking all data transfers. In this project, we show that even physically interrupting
USB data wires does not prevent a charging station from extracting sensitive information
from a smartphone. In particular, we demonstrate that a malicious charging station can
infer smartphone browsing activity by analyzing USB power consumption patterns.
(2) USB Side-channel Attack on Tor. Tor [9] is an application-level low-latency
anonymity network that enables anonymous communication between a client and arbi-
trary Internet destinations. Tor uses onion routers [10] hosted by volunteers to unlink
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the identity and geographical location of the client from the server and to conceal the
identity of the server from any adversary who can observe the client’s network activity.
Because of these properties, Tor is frequently used to provide anonymous connections
to overcome communication restrictions and to evade censorship. Users rely on Tor to
conceal their activities from governments, employers, and ISPs, since those might abuse,
misuse, or accidentally leak sensitive information.
Because Tor is accessed by millions of users [11] including smartphone users (Tor
Orbot, for instance, has more than 10 million installs on Android phones [12]), the
security of Tor is becoming increasingly important. Given prior work on the security of
widely-available public USB charging stations [2], in this work we investigate whether a
malicious charging station can infer which websites are accessed by the Tor user while
charging her smartphone. The ability to determine which website is being accessed
through Tor using power consumption information, rather than through observation of
network tra c, represents a hitherto unexplored and potentially devastating attack.
(3) Memory and Energy E cient Garbled Circuit Evaluation on Smart-
phones. Secure computation involves multiple parties computing the value of a function
without any outside parties. To protect the privacy of each party, no information about
the input of any party is leaked to any other parties. Secure computation has wide
usage in electronic voting, privacy-preserving data mining, and biometric-based authen-
tication. Garbled circuit protocol is one solution for secure two-party computation. The
basic idea of garbled circuit is that one party (“generator”) transforms a function into a
garbled boolean circuit and sends the circuit to another party (“evaluator”) for circuit
evaluation.
Currently, there are two types of circuit evaluation: no-pipelining and pipelining.
The no-pipelining method stores the entire garbled circuit in the memory of the evalu-
ator, a process which requires low power but high memory overhead. In the pipelining
method, the garbled circuit generation and evaluation of di↵erent gates overlap so that
lower memory overhead but higher power consumption, as compared to the no-pipelining
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method, are needed. We propose the use of memory- and energy-e cient garbled cir-
cuit evaluation (MEG) on smartphones. The basic idea of MEG is to split the gates
into batches and transmit the data in bursts. We investigate what burst size is best to
minimize the energy consumption.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation proposes three contributions towards exploiting power for smartphone
security and privacy. The overall contributions are as follows.
Inferring Browsing Activity on Smartphones via USB Power Analysis Side-
channel. We proposed a side-channel attack for a malicious charging station to infer
smartphone browsing activity based on USB power consumption data. Specifically, we
make two contributions.
• To fully characterize the side-channel associated with USB power consumption, we
analyzed how webpage identification accuracy is impacted by variables pertinent
to mobile devices, such as battery charging level, wireless connection type (WiFi or
LTE), and the presence or absence of taps on the screen. To our knowledge, this is
the first work that tests the feasibility of this attack against constraints commonly
encountered in a mobile environment.
• We determined the impact of other variables that have not been considered in prior
studies on power-based side-channels [13]. These include the e↵ects of availability of
the browser cache, training and testing signals collected on di↵erent smartphones,
the time elapsed between the collection of training and testing signals, geographical
proximity between the user and the web server, duration of power traces, and
availability of encrypted (TLS) connections on identification accuracy.
USB Side-channel Attack on Tor. We proposed a new attack that exposes which
website is being browsed by a smartphone user via Tor . Our main contributions are:
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• We demonstrated a technique based on USB power analysis that allows a malicious
charging station to identify which webpages are loaded on a smartphone using
Tor. To our knowledge, this is the first work to study attacks on Tor based on
smartphone power side-channels.
• We validated our attack under realistic smartphone constraints by collecting and
analyzing power traces under several scenarios, including di↵erent networks (WiFi
and LTE), di↵erent devices, and di↵erent battery charging levels. We correctly
identified webpages visited using the o cial mobile Tor browser. We achieved
accuracies between 36.58% and 85.7% when the battery was fully charged, and
between 34.5% and 46% when the battery level was at 30%-50%. In comparison,
accuracy obtained by random website selection is 1% for all websites, and 2% when
considering hidden services or public webpages alone
Memory- and Energy- E cient Garbled Circuit Evaluation on Smartphones.
We introduce a new garbled circuit evaluation scheme on smartphones with improved
memory and energy e ciency. Our main contributions are:
• We evaluated MEG using di↵erent burst size and compared it with existing circuit
evaluation methods. The preliminary evaluation results show that the energy con-
sumption of MEG is less than the current pipelining schemes and close to that of
the no-pipelining method. MEG also significantly reduces the evaluation time as
compared to basic pipelining.
• We propose two versions of MEG: single-threaded and multi-threaded. The multi-
thread version is improved using a slow start technique to reduce the waiting
time for the first bunch of data. We compared the energy consumption and time
overhead of both versions.
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1.3 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss related
work. In Chapter 3, we present our study of inferring browsing activity on smartphones
via USB power analysis side-channel. In Chapter 4, we propose our method of USB
side-channel attack on Tor network. In Chapter 5, we propose our system of memory
and energy e cient garbled circuit evaluation on smartphones. Finally, we conclude the
dissertation in Chapter 6.
7
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter reviews related work in power analysis side-channel attack, and passive and
active attacks on Tor respectively.
2.1 Side-channel Attacks on Smartphones
We review prior work on: (1) side-channel attacks using power analysis; (2) webpage
fingerprinting; and (3) attacks on smartphones via USB port.
Side-channel Attacks Using Power Analysis Clark et al. [13] identified webpages
loaded on a computer by measuring power consumption at the AC wall outlet. Power
traces were analyzed in the frequency domain, and matched using a SVM classifier. The
evaluation results showed that this side-channel attack achieved 86.75% precision and
74% recall.
The main di↵erences between our work and [13] are as follows. (1) Ours is the first
to study this side-channel on smartphones, which drastically di↵er in architecture from
desktops and laptops, and have hardware (e.g., a touchscreen) not usually associated
with traditional computers. Additionally, smartphones adopt aggressive dynamic power
optimization techniques [14] that could interfere with the side-channel. (2) In contrast
with [13], our work explores how the identification accuracy is a↵ected by variables such
as battery charging level, user’s interaction with the touchscreen, trace length, time
8
between training of our identification model and testing, type of wireless connection
(WiFi and LTE), and website characteristics (HTTP vs HTTPS, geographical location).
(3) The results reported in [13] were obtained with 15-second traces, compared to 2-
to 6-second traces in our work. We consider this an important distinction, since trace
length has a large impact on identification accuracy, and most users spend less than 15
seconds on average on a webpage [15].
Several papers analyzed power data from sources other than USB charging ports or
AC outlets to extract cryptographic keys or other private information. For instance,
Genkin et al. [16] demonstrated a side-channel attack based on electric potential from
computer chassis to extract RSA and ElGamal keys. Their work is based on the observa-
tion that the fluctuation in electric potential of the chassis correlates with computation.
Michalevsky et al. [17] introduced PowerSpy, a tool that analyzes aggregate power
consumption on the phone during a period of several minutes to infer the user’s location.
The authors observed that the power consumption of a smartphone is measurably a↵ected
by the smartphone’s distance from the surrounding cellular base station. To obtain
instantaneous power consumption, PowerSpy uses unprivileged Android APIs. For this
reason, PowerSpy infers location information without requesting any explicit permission
to the user, in contrast with the use of privileged location APIs—which require explicit
user confirmation.
Lin et al. [18] demonstrated that it is possible to identify running apps, details about
on-screen content, password lengths, and geographical locations by measuring instan-
taneous power consumption. Our work di↵ers from [18] in the following ways. (1) Li
et al. do not focus on website identification. (2) They use a di↵erent adversary model,
which assumes that the adversary is able to install a malicious app on the smartphone,
or is able to measure power consumption directly at the battery connectors inside the
smartphone, rather than at the USB port. Our attack uses USB charging port to obtain
power traces, and does not require the smartphone to run malicious software. (3) Li et
al. do not consider factors common to smartphones, such as the current battery level
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or the type of network used to retrieve data. These factors, as demonstrated by our
experiments, a↵ect the accuracy of the power-based side channel attack.
Webpage Fingerprinting via Tra c Analysis Several side-channel attacks use net-
work tra c analysis to infer user’s web browsing activities. For example, Hintz et al. [19]
demonstrated that transferred file sizes could be used as a reliable fingerprint for web-
pages. Similarly, Lu et al. [20] exploited both packet size and packet ordering informa-
tion to improve webpage identification success rate. Additionally, studies have shown
that encrypted channels do not protect against tra c analysis. For example, Chen et
al. [21] were able to infer browsing activity via packet analysis on tra c encrypted using
HTTPS and WPA. Our work adds to the current body of work on webpage fingerprinting
by demonstrating a new and complementary side-channel.
USB Data Port Vulnerabilities Karsten et al. [22] and Andy et al. [23] demonstrated
that it is possible to install malicious software on smartphones via their USB port by
exploiting vulnerabilities in mobile operating systems. To prevent these attacks, the
authors suggest to disable/remove data pins in the USB cable. Unfortunately, our work
shows that even if data pins are removed, the charging station can still learn information
about the user’s browsing activity.
2.2 Attacks on Tor Network
There are a number of papers focusing on attacks on Tor. These papers can be broadly
categorized into passive attacks (i.e., based on tra c analysis) and active attacks (based
on tra c modification).
Passive Attacks Based on Tra c Analysis Fingerprinting attacks and tra c confir-
mation attacks belong to this category. Website fingerprinting attacks enable an attacker
to detect patterns that are indicative for webpages in Tor tra c. Herrmann et al. [24]
presented a method that applies common text mining techniques to the normalized fre-
quency distribution of observable IP packet sizes, so as to reveal requested websites.
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Panchenko et al. [25] showed that Tor did not o↵er su cient security against web site
fingerprinting. Their analysis relies on volume, time, and direction of the tra c to fin-
gerprint websites. Cai et al. [26] presented a web page fingerprinting attack that was
able to defeat several recently proposed defenses against tra c analysis attacks, includ-
ing application-level defenses HTTPOS and randomized pipelining over Tor. Abbott et
al. [27] provided an attack to identify a fraction of the Tor users who used a malicious
exit node. This attack tricked a user’s web browser into sending a distinctive signal over
the Tor network. Such signal could be detected by tra c analysis.
In tra c confirmation attacks, the adversary must be able to eavesdrop both ends
of a communication over a long period of time. Levine et al. [28] investigated timing
analysis attacks on low-latency mix systems, and proposed a novel technique, called
defensive dropping, to mitigate timing attacks. Hopper et al. [29] presented two attacks
on low-latency anonymity schemes using the network latency information. The first
attack allowed a pair of colluding web sites to predict, whether two connections from the
same Tor exit node are using the same circuit with high confidence. The second attack
allowed a malicious web site to gain several bits of location information about a client
each time he visits the site. Sun et al. [30] presented asymmetric tra c correlation attack
on Tor network with 95% accuracy, and increased the threat of AS-level attacks by 50% to
100%. Bauer et al. [31] demonstrated that Tor routing optimizations impact its ability to
provide strong anonymity. They further proposed attacks using low-resource Tor nodes
to compromise the entrance and exit servers on a Tor path. Kwon et al. [32] presented
the first practical passive attack against hidden services and their users, based on circuit
fingerprinting attack. With this attack, the adversary can identify the presence of (client
or server) hidden service activity in the network with high accuracy. Murdoch et al. [33]
introduced new tra c-analysis techniques based on a partial view of the network. Their
attack could infer which nodes were used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore
greatly reduced the anonymity provided by Tor. Chakravarty et al. [34] presented a
remotely-mounted attack to expose the network identity of an anonymous client, hidden
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service, or anonymizing proxy. They employed single-end bandwidth estimation tools
and a colluding network entity to modulate tra c directed to the victim.
Our work di↵ers from these studies mainly in the following aspects: (1) the attack
presented in this project is based on USB power analysis, rather than network tra c
analysis or modification; (2) we focus on web page identification for both regular web
pages and web pages served by Tor hidden services; and (3) we study a side-channel
attack on smartphones, rather than on desktop or laptop computers.
Active Attacks Against Tor Network Wang et al. [35] investigated the fundamen-
tal limitations of flow transformations in achieving anonymity. They showed that flow
transformations could not necessarily provide the level of anonymity people expected
or believed. Barbera et al. [36] introduced a new Denial-of-Service attack against Tor
Onion Routers. They exploited a design flaw used by Tor software to build virtual cir-
cuits. Their attack only needed a fraction of the resources required by a network DoS
attack to achieve similar damage on the Tor network.
Our work di↵ers from the above papers because it does not require active changes to
the content of webpages, or tra c injection or manipulation.
There were also e↵orts on side-channel attack via USB power analysis. Yang et al. [37]
presented a side-channel attack on mobile devices that allows an adversary to identify
loaded webpages while the smartphone is charging by controlling the USB charging port.
Our attack is di↵erent from previous work in that: (1) all webpages are loaded using
Tor, which has significant impacts on the loading process, (2) besides public webpages,
we also consider hidden services that are exclusively existent in Tor network, and (3) the
impacts of factors unique for Tor, such as circuit type, are evaluated. Spolaor et al. [38]
demonstrated that sensitive data could be sent as power bursts from a smartphone to a
malicious charging station over a USB cable only with power pins. Their attack needed
to install an app on the phone to modulate the data first. In contrast, our technique
solely depends on measured power consumption to infer the data, not requiring any
additional apps.
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2.3 Optimization on Garbled Circuit
There are several papers on garbled circuit optimization. These works can be categorized
into general optimization and smartphone-focused optimization.
General Optimization of Garbled Circuit Protocol Goyal et al. [39] proposed a
method where the generator uses random seed to construct the circuit and later only
sends the seeds (instead of of the whole circuit) to the evaluator. This technique helps
to save the communication tra c of circuit evaluation. Kolesnikov et al. [40] proposed
a new garbled circuit construction method, where a garbled XOR gates can be replaced
by a standard XOR operation and evaluated “for free”. This technique helps to reduce
the computation and communication cost for circuit evaluation. Pinkas et al. [41]
presented several algorithmic improvements for garbled circuit protocol. They evaluated
these optimizations using reasonably large circuits, such as AES encryption. Huang
et al. [42] presented several techniques, such as fast table lookup, for improving the
running time and memory requirements of the garbled-circuit technique, resulting in
an implementation of generic secure two-party computation that is significantly faster
than previously reported while also scaling to arbitrarily large circuits. [43] assessed the
feasibility of two-party secure computation in the presence of a malicious adversary. They
showed that evaluating billion-gate circuits is feasible when using the existing techniques
and parallelizing steps in the protocol. Lindell et al. [44] presented a protocol using
cut-and-choose to boost to be secure for malicious adversaries. Their protocol is more
e cient and simpler than protocols with the same methodology.
Garbled Circuit Optimization for Smartphones Huang et al. [45] presented a
Java-based secure computation framework for Android smartphones. They found that
processing power, instead of the bandwidth, is the biggest performance obstacle for
secure computation on smartphones. Mood et al. [46] developed a new methodology
of generating garbled circuits that is memory-e cient. They used the standard SFDL
language for describing secure functions as input, and designed a new pseudo-assembly
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language and a template-driven compiler to generates circuit. The evaluation results on
Android devices showed up to 95.6% memory overhead reduction for the 2-set case.
Sedenka et al. [47] designed privacy-preserving protocols for scaled Manhattan and
scaled Euclidean verifiers, which are secure against malicious clients and honest-but-
curious server. They augmented their protocols with principal component analysis that
helps to improve authentication accuracy. Carter et al. [48] created a new SFE protocol
that allows mobile devices to securely outsource the majority of computation required to
evaluate a garbled circuit. Their protocol contained a new out-sourced oblivious transfer
primitive that requires significantly less bandwidth and computation than standard OT
primitives, as well as an outsourced input validation techniques that force the cloud to
prove that it is executing all protocols correctly. Gasti et al. [49] proposed a privacy-
preserving protocols for continuous authentication that securely outsources computation
to an untrusted cloud. Their technique significantly decreases the energy requirement
and running time for computing Manhattan distance and Hamming distance.
Our work di↵ers from the above papers because our method is based on splitting
gates into bursts, and we evaluate the e↵ects of burst sizes. We also improve the current
implementation using multi-threads.
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Chapter 3
On Inferring Browsing Activity
on Smartphones
via USB Power Analysis
Side-channel
3.1 Introduction
Users commonly rely on their smartphones for a variety of energy-intensive activities such
as video streaming, web browsing, connection sharing (hotspot), gaming, and VoIP. As a
consequence, recharging smartphones multiple times a day has become common practice.
A recent survey [1] found that users in the United States charge their smartphones
anywhere from 1.8 to 2.6 times a day on average. To address users’ charging needs, USB
charging stations (or kiosks) are becoming ubiquitous in many public areas, including
airports [2], parks [3, 4], hotels [5], and hospitals [6].
While charging stations undoubtedly provide convenience to smartphone users, they
also expose them to privacy threats. For example, in an attack called “juice-jacking”,
an untrusted charging station exfiltrates data by covertly setting the smartphone into
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USB transfer mode [7]. To counter data exfiltration attacks, hardware devices such as
SyncStop [8] are designed to physically interrupt data wires at the USB port, thereby
blocking all data transfers. In this work, we show that even physically interrupting USB
data wires does not prevent a charging station from extracting sensitive information from
the smartphone. In particular, we demonstrate that a malicious charging station can
infer smartphone browsing activity by analyzing USB power consumption patterns. In
our experiments, we were able to identify with high accuracy which webpage the user
was visiting, by applying standard machine learning techniques to power traces.
We believe that our attack represents a serious threat to privacy, because: (1) USB
charging stations are becoming widespread around the world, and therefore more and
more users can be targeted by this attack; and (2) the modifications required to imple-
ment the attack can be easily concealed (e.g., see [50]), and can therefore go unnoticed
by users.
3.1.1 Contributions and Findings
To fully characterize the side-channel associated with USB power consumption, we ana-
lyzed how webpage identification accuracy is impacted by variables pertinent to mobile
devices, such as battery charging level, wireless connection (WiFi or LTE), and taps on
the screen. To our knowledge, this is the first work that tests the feasibility of this attack
against constraints commonly encountered in a mobile environment. In addition, we de-
termined the impact of other variables that have not been considered in prior studies
on power-based side-channels [13]. These include availability of browser cache, training
and testing signals collected on di↵erent smartphones, the time elapsed between the col-
lection of training and testing signals, geographical proximity between the user and the
web server, duration of power traces, and availability of encrypted (TLS) connections on
identification accuracy. Next, we summarize our findings.
Impact of Battery Charge Level and Taps on Screen Both charging the battery
and tapping on the screen reduced webpage identification accuracy. Identification ac-
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curacy decreased when the smartphone’s battery was charging at 30% level, compared
to when the battery was fully charged. However, even with the decrease in accuracy, it
was still possible to reliably infer browsing information. Similarly, taps on the screen
added significant noise to the power traces, making webpage identification challenging.
Our results show that this factor caused a significant degradation in identification per-
formance.
Impact of Other Variables The time elapsed between collection of training and testing
traces had a major impact on webpage identification accuracy, with training traces older
than 30 days leading to a significant drop in identification accuracy. This suggests
that traces used to train the classifiers should be updated frequently to improve the
attack’s success rate. Increasing the duration of power traces for training and testing led
to improved identification accuracy. We were able to reliably identify webpages under
both WiFi and LTE, even when the training power traces were collected using one type
of connectivity (e.g., LTE), and the testing traces were obtained with another (e.g.,
WiFi). When using di↵erent smartphones for training and testing, accuracies dropped
significantly. However, using two smartphones for training, and a di↵erent smartphone
for testing reduced the drop in webpage identification accuracies.
When the user did not tap on the screen, enabling browser cache improved identifi-
cation accuracy. However, for power traces collected when the user tapped on the screen
and while the smartphone was charging, enabling cache led to a decrease in webpage
identification accuracies.
Our results show that increasing the geographical distance between the smartphone
and the host serving the webpages reduced identification accuracy. When we divided
webpages in foreign (located outside of the continental United States), and local (within
the United States), we observed that webpages hosted locally had slightly higher identi-
fication accuracies than foreign-hosted webpages.
Finally, retrieving webpages via secure connections (HTTPS or, more specifically,
TLS) did not have a measurable impact on identification accuracy.
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Experiment Results In our experiments, we used machine learning algorithms to
identify which webpage the user visited out of a closed set of fifty webpages [51]. We
were able to achieve identification accuracies as high as 98.8% with 2-second traces.
Even in the worst case, i.e., when the cache was enabled, the user tapped on the screen,
and the battery was charging from 30%, we achieved an identification accuracy of 54.2%
with 6-second traces. When training and testing traces were collected using di↵erent
smartphones, identification accuracy was at least 44.5%. This is significantly higher than
choosing one out of fifty webpages at random (which leads to 2% baseline accuracy).
3.2 Experiment Setup
We collected power traces while webpages were loading on two types of smartphones:
Samsung Galaxy S4, and Samsung Galaxy S6. We used the homepages of the 50 most
popular (non-adult) websites, based on Alexa ranking [51] (see Table 3.1). These web-
sites represent over 30% of the page views on the Internet [13]. To collect power traces
during webpage loading, we instrumented the USB charging circuit as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. Our circuit connects a DC power supply, a smartphone, and a data acquisition
card (DAQ), and measures voltage variations (and therefore the corresponding power
consumed) across a 0.1 ⌦ shunt resistor. To satisfy the USB charging specifications [52],
we connected the data pins of the USB cable using a 200 ⌦ resistor.
Table 3.1: Alexa top 50 non-adult websites, as of June 2015. The table reports whether
each website is foreign or domestic, and weather and the connection type is HTTP or
HTTPS.
Webpage
Do-
mes-
tic
HTTPS
Webpage
Do-
mes-
tic
HTTPS
Webpage
Do-
mes-
tic
HTTPS
Webpage
Do-
mes-
tic
HTTPS
google.com X X sina.cn vimeo.com X X fc2.com X
facebook.com X X weibo.com imgur.com X snapdeal.com
youtube.com X tmall.com wordpress.com X X ask.com X
yahoo.com X X ok.ru cnet.com X alibaba.com X
baidu.com ebay.com X msn.com X espncricinfo.com X
wikipedia.com X X about.com X pinterest.com X X 360.cn
amazon.com X hao123.com yandex.ru stackoverflow.com X
twitter.com X X reddit.com X paypal.com X X netflix.com X X
taobao.com bing.com X microsoft.com X 163.com
live.com X etsy.com X X vk.com slideshare.net X
qq.com instagram.com X X aliexpress.com X craigslist.org X
bankofamerica.com X X sohu.com apple.com X
linkedin.com X X tumblr.com X X imdb.com X
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the setup used to collect power traces.
Most smartphones use lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries due to their high energy density.
The charging profile of Li-ion batteries encompasses two stages [53]. In the first stage,
the smartphone charging circuit applies constant current to the battery. This stage
ends when the battery reaches a specific charging voltage (usually between 3.7 V and
4.2 V). In the second stage, the battery is charged at a constant voltage, and the current
gradually decreases until it reaches a termination value. Because the battery charging
process could take several hours, the current used to charge the battery does not vary
significantly while the smartphone is loading a webpage.
We used an Agilent E3630A DC power supply [54] as the power source. We mea-
sured the voltage drop across the shunt resistor using a National Instrument USB-6211
(DAQ) [55] at a sampling rate of 200 kHz. We set the power supply to output a fixed volt-
age of 5.5 V. This voltage is higher than the nominal USB voltage of 5 V to compensate
for the voltage drop introduced by the shunt resistor. The resulting voltage was between
5.32 V and 5.48 V, which is within the tolerance of many modern smartphones [52]. The
DAQ’s data output was connected to a laptop, which stored data for o✏ine analysis
using LabVIEW. Figure 3.2 shows the power consumption traces collected while loading
the homepages of google.com and youtube.com.
We collected power traces in two modes: user-actuated, and automated. With user-
actuated traces, the user initiates webpage loading by typing a URL in Mobile Chrome’s
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Figure 3.2: Power traces collected during the first 6 seconds of automated webpage
loading activity. The left and right panels show power traces collected while loading
google.com, and youtube.com, respectively. The x axis shows time (in seconds) from
the beginning of the webpage loading activity, and the y axis shows the power consumed
by the smartphone.
address bar. To collect automated traces, we developed an Android application that
launches the Chrome browser, and uses it to load the intended webpage. Our application
allows 10 seconds for webpage loading (only the first 6 seconds of data were recorded), and
then loads the next webpage. Before each measurement, we closed all other applications
on the smartphone, and set the screen brightness to a constant level.
User-actuated and automated traces were collected under two conditions: battery
level (30% vs. 100%),1 and browser cache (enabled vs. disabled). We chose these condi-
tions because they impact smartphone energy consumption. When the battery is fully
charged, almost all power from the charger is used to load webpages. In contrast, when
the smartphone is charging, a sizable (almost constant) amount of power is used to
charge the battery, hence a↵ecting the traces. Cache availability was chosen because
cache misses increase network activity, and therefore radio activity. Retrieving data
wirelessly requires more energy than loading it from local flash memory.
We collected 40 automated traces per webpage for each of the following combinations:
30% battery, cache; 30% battery, no cache; 100% battery, cache; 100% battery, no cache.
1We implemented the 30% battery level condition as follows. We charged the smartphone battery to
30% level, and then started collecting power traces while still charging the smartphone. As the battery
reached 35% level, we interrupted data collection, discharged it to 30%, and resumed the collection of
power traces.
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Additionally, we collected 10 user-actuated traces for the same combinations. To collect
traces, we used four Samsung Galaxy S4 devices (in the rest of this work, we refer
to these devices as D1, D2, D3, and D4) in most of the experiments. To analyze the
impact of di↵erent smartphone models on the attack, we also conducted experiments on
a Samsung Galaxy S6 (referred to as D5). We collected all traces in Old Westbury (NY),
and in Williamsburg (VA). Further details on our datasets and their usage in our work
are provided in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Details on the dataset used in this work. The devices used for data collection
are four Samsung Galaxy S4 (labelled D1, D2, D3, and D4 in the table), and one Samsung
Galaxy S6 (D5).
Location Device(s) Network Collection Method Browser Cache Battery Level Collection Time Usage in our work
Old Westbury
(NY) Galaxy S4 (D1) WiFi
Automated
Disabled
100%
May 2015
Table 3.8
June 2015
July 2015 Table 3.3, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10
30% July 2015 Table 3.3, 3.9, 3.10
Enabled
100%
Aug. 2015 Table 3.3, 3.9, 3.10
30%
User-actuated
Disabled
100%
July 2015
Table 3.4
30%
Enabled
100%
Aug. 2015
30%
Williamsburg
(VA)
Galaxy S4 (D2)
WiFi
Automated Disabled 100% Aug. 2016 Table 3.5
LTE
Galaxy S4
WiFi Automated Disabled
100% Aug. 2016 Table 3.6
(D2, D3, and D4) 30% Sept. 2016 Table 3.7
Galaxy S6 (D5) WiFi Automated Disabled
100% Aug. 2016
Table 3.3
30% Sept. 2016
3.3 Webpage Identification
Our webpage identification process consists of training and testing phases. In the training
phase: (1) we extracted frequency-domain features from the power traces; and (2) we
trained a classifier (Random Forest [56]) on the extracted feature vectors. During the
testing phase, we use the trained classifier to predict webpage labels on new data. To
improve identification accuracy, we performed feature extraction on partially overlapping
segments from traces, and implemented classifier voting. Next, we provide details on
feature extraction, classification, and trace segmentation.
Classifier Training and TestingWe used Random Forest [56] to classify power traces
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because in our experiments it outperformed other commonly used classifiers, such as
SVM [57, 58], and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [59]. We used the WEKA [60]
implementation of Random Forest.
We experimented with four training-testing scenarios. The first involved 40 power
traces per webpage, collected using automated webpage loading; 20 traces were used for
training the classifier, and the remaining 20 traces for testing. This scenario is used
when training and testing are performed with data from the same smartphone, such as
in tables 3.3, 3.5, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10.
In the second scenario, we trained the classifier using all 40 automatically-collected
traces, and performed testing with 10 traces collected via user-actuated page loading.
This scenario was used with data is collected with user taps, i.e., in Table 3.4.
In the third scenario, we trained our classifier using 40 traces per webpage, collected
using automated webpage loading, on one smartphone device; we then used 40 traces
collected from a di↵erent smartphone device for testing. This scenario was used in tables
3.6 and 3.7, and in Figure 3.6.
Finally, in the fourth scenario, we trained the classifier using 80 traces from two
smartphones (40 traces from each device), and tested on 40 traces from a di↵erent
smartphone. This scenario was used in tables 3.6 and 3.7, and in Figure 3.6.
Feature Extraction We transformed each power trace to its corresponding frequency-
domain representation using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [61]. To reduce the impact of
noise on individual frequencies, we divided the frequency range into equal-size bins. For
each bin, we calculated the average amplitude of all the frequencies in it. The average
amplitudes were used as features. We experimented with di↵erent numbers of bins, and
settled on using 125 bins (resulting in 125 features) when using the same device for
training and testing, because this value led to the highest identification accuracy. When
using di↵erent devices and smartphone models during training and testing, we used
the first 15 of 125 bins (i.e., first 15 features) corresponding to the 15 lowest frequencies,
which allowed us to achieve the highest identification accuracy for this setting. Figure 3.3
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate amplitudes corresponding to the first 60 bins computed from the
power traces of google.com and youtube.com. (Corresponding time-domain traces are
illustrated in Figure 3.2.) The x axis represents the index of each bin.
shows the result of feature extraction on the data in Figure 3.2. Each data point in
Figure 3.3 represents a feature.
Trace Segmentation and Voting Variable network conditions, web-server load, and
smartphone background applications introduce intermittent noise in power traces. To
mitigate the e↵ects of noise, we divided each trace into overlapping 0.5-second segments.
Feature extraction was performed on each segment, and the classifier was trained using
segments from all traces. For testing, we classified individual segments of a session, and
used the classification results as votes. Each trace was then assigned to the class that
received the largest number of votes. This strategy of segmenting and using majority
voting led to an improvement in accuracy between 0.1% and 7.7% compared to using
entire traces.
Evaluation of Identification Performance To evaluate classifier performance, we
calculated Rank 1 and Rank 5 identification accuracies. With Rank 1, a trace is classified
correctly if the most popular label assigned to the trace’s segments is the correct label
for the trace. In case of ties, the classifier outputs the label with the highest associated
confidence, defined as Random forest leaf node probability. With Rank 5, we consider a
trace as correctly classified if the correct label appears within the 5 most popular labels.
Because our identification task involves predicting 50 webpages, the baseline accura-
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cies, obtained by randomly guessing the webpages, are 2% for Rank 1 and 10% for Rank
5.
Finally, for each rank, we also present the Normalized Rank-n Accuracy, which is
defined as follows. Let pn be the probability that the classifier correctly labels a trace for
Rank-n. The probability of correctly guessing the website loaded by the smartphone is
computed as pn/n, and represents the probability that the adversary guesses the correct
website label given the Rank-n output of the classifier.
We consider this metric because it represents the uncertainty an adversary encounters
in identifying the website correctly as the rank increases. For example, if Rank 2 accuracy
is 60%, and Rank 5 accuracy is 95%, then the normalized Rank 2 accuracy is 30%, while
the normalized Rank 5 accuracy is 19%. This shows that if the adversary is interested
in identifying a unique website visited by the user, Rank 2 leads to better results. On
the other hand, if the adversary only needs to know if the user is visiting any of the five
webpages identified in Rank 5 (e.g., because they are all from social networking websites),
then the Rank 5 result is more meaningful. Therefore, the information provided by this
metric complements the Rank 1 and Rank 5 accuracy results presented throughout the
project.
3.4 Evaluation
We evaluated identification accuracy under three variables: (1) trace length (2 s, 4 s,
and 6 s), (2) cache enabled vs. disabled, and (3) battery charge level (30% vs. 100%). In
this section, we report how these variables impact identification accuracy for automated
and user-actuated data collection. Identification accuracies under other variables, such
as di↵erent smartphones used in training and testing, type of wireless connectivity, time
elapsed between collection of training and testing traces, location of the hosts serving
the webpages, and HTTP vs. HTTPS, are reported in sections 3.5 and 3.5.
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Table 3.3: Identification Accuracy (in %) using frequency-domain features and classifier
voting for automated dataset collected using D1. For comparison, results from a Samsung
Galaxy S6 (D5) are also reported. All experiments were performed using 125 features.
Rank 1 Rank 5
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
Charged, no cache 96.7 99.0 99.3 99.0 99.4 99.8
Charged, w/ cache 98.8 99.6 100 99.6 100 100
Charging (30%), no cache 82.8 91.7 95.7 92.8 96.7 98.5
Charging (30%), w/ cache 87.6 94.4 96.2 94.5 97.4 97.6
S6, charged, no cache 84.3 94.8 97.1 94.5 98.6 99.5
S6, charging (30%), no cache 75.2 82.8 90.5 91.8 93.7 97.8
3.4.1 Identification Accuracy on Automated Dataset
Our results for the automated dataset are reported in Table 3.3. We achieved identi-
fication accuracy of at least 82.8% for Rank 1, and at least 92.8% for Rank 5 using a
Samsung Galaxy S4, with 2 second traces. With a Samsung Galaxy S6, accuracies were
at least 75.2% for Rank 1, and at least 91.8% for Rank 5. Next, we discuss how each
variable a↵ects identification accuracy.
Trace Duration Increasing the duration of the traces led to an improvement of iden-
tification accuracy. Although we achieved the highest identification accuracy with six-
second traces, we also had good identification accuracies (Rank 1: 82.8%-98.8%) with
2-second traces, as shown in Table 3.3. Given that most webpages load within a few
seconds on smartphones (2.9 s to 5 s on average, according to [62]), our results indicate
that the attack correctly identifies a webpage within the typical loading time.
Caching Our results show that enabling cache improved identification accuracy (see
Table 3.3). This is further validated by our results, reported in Table 3.9, where enabling
cache improved identification accuracy for foreign-hosted websites more than for websites
located within the United States. This is because the farther the host serving the content,
the more network-related noise is added to the traces (see Section 3.5 for further details).
Battery Level Users connect their smartphones to charging ports at various battery
levels [1]. Our experiments show that this variability impacts identification accuracy. In
particular, we were consistently able to classify traces with higher accuracy when the
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Figure 3.4: Power traces obtained while loading the same webpage (yahoo.com) with
30% and 100% battery level. The figure shows that the trace corresponding to 100%
battery level exhibits a relatively higher dynamic range, because it is not capped by the
1.8 A limit which is often reached by the trace corresponding to 30% battery level.
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Figure 3.5: Average inter-class DTW distance on automated traces for each webpage.
Measurements are performed with battery fully charged, and with cache enabled. Data
is sorted in ascending order of average DTW distance.
battery was fully charged (see Table 3.3).
This can be explained by comparing the power traces illustrated in Figure 3.4. The
USB charging specifications set an upper bound of 1.8 A to the amount of current that the
smartphone can draw from the USB port. If the phone is charging, a substantial amount
of the available current is directed to the battery, and therefore the fluctuations in power
consumption due to webpage loading is limited. This is evident in Figure 3.4, where the
signal corresponding to 30% battery has considerably lower variability compared to the
signal collected with fully charged battery.
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3.4.2 Identification Accuracy on User-Actuated Dataset
Once we included user activity in the form of taps, identification accuracy dropped
significantly due to tap-induced noise. This is because tap characteristics (e.g., tap
location on the screen, timing, and duration) are di↵erent in each trace, which leads
to noisy traces. To validate this observation, we computed the average (intra-class)
Dynamic TimeWarp (DTW) distance between pairs of user-actuated traces, and between
pairs of automated traces, under di↵erent caching and charging conditions. The average
distance between user-actuated traces was consistently higher than the distance between
automated traces. With cache enabled and fully charged battery, the average DTW
distance between user-actuated traces was 17%-38% higher than the average distance
between automatically-collected traces. When the smartphone was charging from 30%
level, and with cache enabled, the DTW distance increased by 34%-86% when including
taps. Once cache was disabled, the average DTW distance increased by 5%-15% with
taps and with the battery fully charged. With no cache and battery charging from 30%
level, the average DTW distance between automated and user-actuated traces increased
by 31%-56%. Figure 3.5 shows the relative distance for each webpage with fully charged
battery and cache enabled.
While two seconds were su cient to classify webpages with high confidence using
automated traces, this was not the case with traces from the user-actuated dataset.
Regardless of caching and charging, we achieved good Rank 1 accuracy with six-second
traces. In this setting, we correctly identified webpages between 54.2% and 88.4% of the
times (for reference, selecting a webpage at random out of 50 leads to 2% accuracy). We
achieved good Rank 5 accuracy (53.6% to 95%, compared to 10% with random chance)
with four- and six-second traces. Charging had still a measurable impact on identification
accuracy: identification on a fully charged phone consistently led to better results, all
other variables being the same. Enabling cache with fully charged battery led to a 2.2%-
5.8% improvement in identification accuracy. However, when we enabled cache in traces
collected at 30% battery level, webpage identification accuracy dropped significantly. We
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Table 3.4: Identification accuracy (in %) using frequency domain features and classifier
voting for user-actuated traces (i.e., with taps) collected using D1
. All results were obtained using 125 features.
Rank 1 Rank 5
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
Charged, no cache 9.0 56.0 82.6 19.0 79.2 92.8
Charged, w/ cache 7.0 58.6 88.4 22.4 83.0 95.0
Charging (30%), no cache 5.8 39.2 70.0 18.8 70.0 88.4
Charging (30%), w/ cache 4.2 35.8 54.2 15.8 53.6 72.0
Table 3.5: Identification Accuracy (in %) using frequency-domain features and classifier
voting for automated dataset collected using D2. All experiments were performed with
a fully-charged battery, and no cache, using 125 features.
Rank 1 Rank 5
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
LTE training, LTE testing 82.7 98.2 99.7 94.2 100 100
LTE training, WiFi testing 24.9 55.2 73.9 45.2 72.8 86.0
WiFi training, LTE testing 23.8 68.6 84.8 50.3 85.1 95.7
hypothesize that this happened because taps on screen and battery charging contribute
to a substantial increase in noise in power traces. Under these conditions, networking
becomes an important source of discriminability between website traces. Enabling cache
reduces the contribution of the network component to the power traces, in turn reducing
classification accuracy.
Overall, our experiments show that although the presence of taps substantially re-
duces identification accuracy compared to automated collection of power traces, it is still
possible to accurately classify six-second user-actuated traces.
3.5 Impact of Other Variables
We examined the identification accuracies according to the following variables: (1) di↵er-
ent smartphones used for training and testing (training traces were collected from one or
more smartphones that are not used for testing); (2) LTE and WiFi training and testing;
(3) aging of training traces; (4) domestic vs. foreign websites, and (5) websites accessible
via unencrypted connections (denoted as “HTTP”) vs. accessible through TLS-encrypted
links (denoted as “HTTPS”). Table 3.1 in Appendix indicates which websites are local,
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Table 3.6: Identification Accuracy (in %) using frequency-domain features and classifier
voting for automated dataset. All experiments were performed with a fully-charged
battery, and no cache, using 15 features.
Training
Testing D3 D4 D2
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
D3 64.3 89.9 94.9 48.8 73.0 77.5 34.3 60.0 69.7
D4 48.4 73.1 79.9 67.7 93.5 96.6 43.1 71.1 75.0
D2 34.3 63.0 69.8 44.1 74.2 75.9 66.0 91.1 94.6
D4+D2 52.7 78.4 84.3
D3+D2 56.7 84.4 85.8
D3+D4 45.9 75.9 81.1
Table 3.7: Identification Accuracy (in %) using frequency-domain features and classifier
voting for automated dataset. All experiments were performed with the battery charging
from 30%, and no cache, using 15 features.
Training
Testing D3 D4 D2
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
D3 48.5 67.8 79.6 40.3 56.6 59.9 31.9 38.8 50.4
D4 40.6 58.7 67.8 41.7 61.8 69.6 22.8 36.6 51.2
D2 28.4 42.3 51.3 23.2 35.4 44.5 40.3 56.4 68.2
D4+D2 44.0 62.7 72.1
D3+D2 40.1 56.5 65.8
D3+D4 33.7 42.2 58.4
and/or accessible over HTTPS. Our experiments show that the attack is robust to these
factors. Next, we provide details on our findings with respect to each variable. For all
experiments in this section, we used only automated traces.
Training and Testing Traces from Di↵erent Devices
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 summarize our result when using di↵erent smartphones for training
and testing. Using one smartphone for training, and a di↵erent smartphone for testing
led to a significant drop in identification accuracy. On the other hand, by training on
two devices, and testing on a third, we were able to achieve identification accuracies
above 80% with 6-second traces. This is likely because the classifier generalizes better
when trained on multiple devices, which account for more variety within the traces.
Training and Testing using WiFi and LTE We collected power traces while ac-
cessing websites over both WiFi and LTE and experimented with three training-testing
configurations: (1) LTE training and LTE testing, (2) LTE training and WiFi testing,
and (3) WiFi training and LTE testing. Our results (see Table 3.5) show that accuracy
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Table 3.8: Identification Accuracy (in %) using 70-day-old and 32-day-old training
datasets collected using D1. All results were obtained using 125 features.
Rank 1 Rank 5
2 s 4 s 6 s 2 s 4 s 6 s
32-day old, charged, w/ cache 8.0 11.9 13.0 24.7 27.8 32.3
70-day old, charged, w/ cache 3.6 3.7 2.2 13.8 20.2 24.3
obtained when training and testing on LTE is comparable to that of training and testing
on WiFi (in Table 3.3). Further, though there was reduction in accuracies with WiFi
training-LTE testing and LTE training-WiFi testing, the overall results were significantly
higher than the baseline (2%) at Rank 1, and at least 73.9% for 6 second traces.
Aging of Training Traces Many of the webpages considered in this work contain
content that changes over time. For example, the home page of yahoo.com shows recent
news, and is therefore updated several times a day. For these webpages, a training
dataset collected at a specific point in time might not be representative of the webpage’s
behavior at a later point, when the testing traces are collected. To determine the impact
of aging on training data, we collected testing traces 32 and 70 days after training, with
cache enabled and fully charged battery. The corresponding results are summarized in
Table 3.8. For reference, all traces used to obtain the results reported in tables 3.3
and 3.4 were collected within a 48-hour timeframe.
When we trained the classifier on traces collected 32 days before testing, Rank 1
identification accuracy dropped below 13%. Even worse, the identification accuracy
with training traces collected 70 days before testing was consistently below 4%. This
suggests that, in order to achieve good identification accuracy, training traces should be
updated frequently.
Foreign vs. Domestic WebsitesWe tested this variable because the distance between
the client and the host serving a webpage is known to a↵ect packets’ delay and jitter [63].
More specifically, the farther the host serving the content, the more variable will be its
measured bandwidth and delay. In turn, this variability a↵ects page loading, and hence
the corresponding power traces.
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Table 3.9: Rank 1 webpage identification accuracy (in %) for domestic (indicated as
“Dom.”) and foreign (“For.”) websites. Traces were collected using D1. All results were
obtained using 125 features.
2 s 4 s 6 s
Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For.
Charged, no cache 98.1 92.9 99.7 97.1 99.7 98.2
Charged, w/ cache 99.4 97.1 99.4 100 100 100
Charging (30%), no cache 82.5 83.9 92.5 89.3 96.4 93.9
Charging (30%), w/ cache 87.5 87.9 94.2 95.0 96.1 96.4
We determined whether a webpage was served from a host (e.g., a server, or a
CDN) within the continental United States or outside the United States using the Whois
databases from ARIN [64] and APNIC [65]. Our dataset is composed of 36 domestic
websites, and 14 foreign websites.
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 3.9. Our experiments show
that the location of the host serving a webpage has a very small impact on identification
accuracy. Enabling cache led to a larger improvement in webpage identification accuracy
for foreign websites than for domestic websites.
HTTPS vs. HTTP Websites We tested this variable because the use of encryption
between the smartphone and the server can introduce noise in power traces. In particular,
TLS requires additional communication rounds to exchange TLS session keys before a
connection can be established. This can potentially increase the variability of power
traces.
A total of 15 webpages in our dataset allow users to retrieve content using HTTPS,
while the remaining 35 webpages only allow plain HTTP connections. Our results, re-
ported in Table 3.10, show that there is no significant di↵erence in identification accuracy
between the two types of websites. This indicates that the attack is as e↵ective for iden-
tifying securely transmitted webpages as with webpages transmitted without encryption.
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Table 3.10: Rank 1 webpage identification accuracy (in %) for webpages retrieved via
HTTPS and plain HTTP. Traces were collected using D1. All results were obtained
using 125 features.
2 s 4 s 6 s
Scenario HTTPS HTTP HTTPS HTTP HTTPS HTTP
Charged, no cache 97.7 96.1 99.7 98.7 99.3 99.3
Charged, w/ cache 99.7 98.4 98.7 100 100 100
Charging (30%), no cache 81.7 83.4 90.0 92.3 95.0 96.0
Charging (30%), w/ cache 89.3 86.9 94.0 94.6 96.0 96.3
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Figure 3.6: Rank vs. Normalized Rank-n Accuracy plots show the results of our exper-
iments with automated dataset, using frequency-domain features and classifier voting.
All experiments were performed with a fully-charged battery and no cache. The plots in
the top figure were obtained using 15 features, and the plots in the middle and bottom
figures were obtained using 125 features, because these settings led to the best results.
3.6 Normalized Rank-n Accuracy
Figure 3.6 shows the Rank vs. Normalized Rank-n Accuracy plots for our classifier, ob-
tained using frequency-domain features. All traces used in this evaluation were obtained
with no cache, and with fully-charged battery.
Figures 3.6a and 3.6b show results of experiments where training and testing traces
were from di↵erent devices, and di↵erent connectivity, respectively. The two figures
show that increasing the rank leads to a decrease in normalized Rank-n accuracy. This
means that the adversary has lower probability of correctly guessing a webpage as the
rank increases. This is because Rank 1 accuracy is already substantially higher than
the baseline. Therefore, increasing the rank provides almost no benefits towards cor-
rectly guessing the webpage. Although the normalized Rank-n accuracy approaches the
baseline as the rank increases, figures 3.6a and 3.6b show that, even at Rank 12, our
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technique still outperforms the baseline.
We evaluated the traces collected on a single smartphone, with training and testing
data collected 70 days apart. This figure shows that when outdated traces are used
for training, Rank 1 classification no longer provides the highest normalized Rank-n
accuracy. This is because of two reasons: (1) Rank 1 accuracy in this setting is close to
the baseline; and (2) as the rank increases, the classifier outputs a better uncertainty set
compared to random choice. As a result, the Rank 2 to Rank 4 accuracies increase more
than the uncertainty due to the increased rank. For instance, when going from Rank 1 to
Rank 4, the output of the classifier includes three additional webpages that are far more
likely to be correct than three pages chosen at random. Therefore, in this particular
case, the adversary is more likely to correctly guess the webpage by first increasing the
rank from 1 to 4.
3.7 Conclusion and Future work
In this work, we demonstrated that it is possible to accurately infer browsing activity
on a smartphone using USB power consumption measurements. Our work is the first
to study this side-channel attack on smartphones, and to analyze a multitude of factors
that a↵ect the traces that are collected during the attack, such as: battery charging level,
user interaction with the touchscreen, trace length, time between collection of training
and testing traces, WiFi and LTE connectivity, training and testing device mismatch,
and website characteristics such as type of connection (HTTP or HTTPS) and location
of the host serving the webpage relative to the smartphone.
We performed extensive experiments to validate our approach. Our results show that
the attack successfully identifies webpages loaded using the standard Android mobile
browser at least 91.7% of the times within four seconds for the automated dataset.
For our user-actuated dataset, identification accuracy was between 54.2% and 88.4%
with six seconds of power consumption data. Factors such as the availability of cache,
the use of secure connections (HTTPS) and the location of the websites had a small
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e↵ect on identification accuracies. Other factors, such as mismatch between training and
testing traces due to the use of di↵erent devices and the type of wireless connectivity
negatively impacted accuracies. However, training on multiple devices allowed us to
achieve accuracies substantially higher than the baseline for Rank 1.
Overall, our results show that the attack is highly e↵ective, because webpage loading
generates power signatures that are: (1) distinctive: di↵erent webpages generate dif-
ferent power traces due to factors such as the amount of data (text, images, and videos)
being retrieved, the number of TCP connections required to retrieve all webpage com-
ponents, and the computational cost of the scripts running within the webpage; and (2)
consistent: each time a particular page is loaded, it generates a power trace that is
similar to its previous power traces.
Though our work focuses on webpage identification, we believe that the same side-
channel can also be used to detect other user activities, such as which application is
currently being used, and the timing of touch events (including typing information). We
consider this work as the first step towards a deeper understanding of the extent of the
information leaked through power analysis of the USB port of a smartphone. Clearly,
there are a multitude of factors that we did not address in this project, such as number
of applications installed on the smartphone, background processes, network congestion,
WiFi/LTE signal strength, and specific user interaction. We leave the analysis of these
factors to future work.
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Chapter 4
USB Side-channel Attack on Tor
4.1 Introduction
Tor [9] is an application-level low-latency anonymity network that enables anonymous
communication between a client and arbitrary Internet destinations. Tor uses onion
routers [10] hosted by volunteers to unlink the identity and geographical location of the
client from the server, and to conceal the identity of the server to any adversary that can
observe the client’s network activity. Because of these properties, Tor is frequently used
to provide anonymous connections to overcome communication restrictions and to evade
censorship. Users rely on Tor to conceal their activities from governments, employers,
and ISPs, since those might abuse, misuse, or accidentally leak sensitive information.
Additionally, Tor can be used to improve privacy and security of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices [66][67]. For instance, if these devices access cloud services via Tor, the cloud
provider is unable to determine which devices belong to the same household. Further,
IoT devices can provide remote access by instantiating a Tor hidden service [68], thus
concealing the identity and location of the owner of the devices.
Because Tor is accessed by millions of users [11], including smartphone users (Tor
Orbot, for instance, has more than 10 million installs on Android phones [12]), the
security of Tor is becoming increasingly important. Given prior work on the security of
widely-available public USB charging stations [2], in this work we investigate whether a
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malicious charging station can infer which websites are accessed by the Tor user while
charging her smartphones. The ability to determine which website is being accessed
through Tor using power consumption information, rather than through observation of
network tra c, represents a hitherto unexplored and potentially devastating attack.
Accessing web content via Tor has significant e↵ects on how each webpage is loaded.
When users browse webpages using Tor, all requests and the corresponding responses are
forwarded by three Tor relays in the Tor circuit. Each relay encrypts and decrypts all
data in transit. Since the relays are geographically distributed, each packet must travel a
long distance before reaching its destination, thus introducing large and variable network
delays. Further, because Tor circuits are usually composed of entirely di↵erent sets of
relays, the introduced delay adds further uncertainty and introduces inconsistency when
loading the same webpage. The construction of Tor circuits consumes additional energy,
thus adding background noise to the power traces for webpage loading.
To illustrate how Tor a↵ects webpage loading, we measured the loading time of six
webpages on a Samsung Galaxy S6 with and without Tor. We loaded each webpage
5 times. The results are shown in Figure 4.1. Using Tor not only greatly increased
the loading time (by over 4 times on average); it also introduced a larger variation
within the loading time. The average relative standard deviation of loading time was
40.54% with Tor and 21.98% without Tor. The e↵ects of loading webpages with Tor
are further reflected in the power traces. Figure 4.2 shows the power traces collected
while loading the homepage of google.com. We compared the power trace when loading
the same webpage directly and using Tor (on the same smartphone and mobile browser).
When loading google.com without Tor, most energy consumption occurs within the first
second. When using Tor, the energy consumption is spreaded across a longer period (the
first 7 seconds). The appearance of such random power patterns leads us to ask whether
it is possible to identify webpages based on power signatures when using Tor.
To answer this question, in this project we introduce a new attack on Tor. This
attack enables a malicious charging station to identify which website is being visited via
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Figure 4.1: Loading time for six public webpages without Tor (left) vs. using Tor
(right).
Tor by smartphone users. Our attack relies on power measurements performed while the
user is charging her smartphone, and allows the adversary to determine which websites
are visited. We were able to correctly identify websites accessed via the Orbot/Orfox Tor
browser [69] with accuracies between 34.5% to 85.7% under realistic constraints, such
as di↵erent network types (LTE and WiFi) and battery levels (30% to 50%, and 100%).
Further, our attack was successful in identifying not only regular webpages, but also pages
served by Tor hidden services, thereby increasing the scope of the threats identified in this
work. We consider this a serious attack on Tor because (1) public charging stations are
becoming widely available, making the attack scenario in this project very realistic and
widespread, and (2) the level of privilege required to implement this attack is minimal,
as it needs no access to (or manipulation of) network tra c, no malicious servers, and
no exploitation of bugs in the Tor software. Because the security of Tor is critical to
guarantee the safety and freedom of a large number of users around the world, any low-
privilege attack that reliably and accurately infers user activity should be considered
very seriously.
There are many studies on Tor attacks, which can be broadly categorized into pas-
sive attacks based on tra c analysis and active attacks against Tor network. For passive
attacks based on tra c analysis, most studies are dedicated to either (1) website fin-
gerprinting attacks [21-24], which enable an attacker to detect patterns indicative for
webpages in Tor tra c, or (2) tra c confirmation attacks [25-31], which eavesdrop on
both ends of a communication over a long period of time to deanonymize Tor users. As
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Figure 4.2: Power traces collected during the first 10 seconds of loading google.com
without Tor (upper plot) vs. using Tor (lower plot). The x axis shows time from the
beginning of the webpage loading, and the y axis shows the power drawn from the USB
port.
for active attacks against Tor network, some studies are devoted to path-selection attacks
based on network congestion [32]. Others exploit design flaws in Tor and propose DoS
attacks to disable Tor nodes [33]. Compared to these attacks, our technique requires no
privileged access to the network or exploitation of bugs in the Tor software. Particularly,
our attack only depends on the power consumption data measured at the USB charging
port.
Table 4.1: Fifty webpages selected from Alexa top non-adult websites (as of Dec 2016).
google.com amazon.com ebay.com microsoft.com fc2.com sogou.com wikia.com dropbox.com cnn.com
facebook.com twitter.com wordpress.com vk.com snapdeal.com blogger.com pixnet.net whatsapp.com espn.com
youtube.com sina.cn msn.com apple.com ask.com naver.com coccoc.com nicovideo.jp thepiratebay.org
yahoo.com weibo.cn pinterest.com imdb.com stackoverflow.com mail.ru adf.ly rakuten.co.jp daum.net
wikipedia.org ok.ru paypal.com office.com netflix.com github.com adobe.com bbc.com nytimes.com
dailymail.co.uk stackexchange.com booking.com indeed.com salesforce.com
Table 4.2: Fifty random selected hidden services (all with .onion as domain name
su x).
rougmnvswfsmd4dq yuxv6qujajqvmypv nql7pv7k32nnqor2 s5q54hfww56ov2xc sblib3fk2gryb46d qputrq3ejx42btla 4yjes6zfucnh7vcj abbujjh5vqtq77wg
ityukvsoqjgzcimm kxojy6ygju4h6lwn cashis7ra6cy5vye 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m fdwocbsnity6vzwd zqktlwi4fecvo6ri b34xhb2kjf3nbuyk 74ypjqjwf6oejmax
65px7xq64qrib2fx fzqnrlcvhkgbdwx5 clockwise3rldkgu libertygb2nyeyay xmh57jrzrnw6insl jmkxdr4djc3cpsei djypjjvw532evfw3 76qugh5bey5gum7l
hss3uro2hsxfogfq kpynyvym6xqi7wz2 fbcy5ylyoeqzqzcr undergunbgzlc2ey o6klk2vxlpunyqt6 ccxdnvotswsk2c3f usjudr3c6ez6tesi nare7pqnmnojs2pg
vu2wohoog2bytxgr xfnwyig7olypdq5r 54ogum7gwxhtgiya slwc4j5wkn3yyo5j c3jemx2ube5v5zpg flibustahezeous3 kbvbh4kdddiha2ht tetatl6umgbmtv27
answerstedhctbek tfwdi3izigxllure gjobqjj7wyczbqie ll6lardicrvrljvq aaaajqiyzj34rhjm hss3uro2hsxfogfq w363zoq3ylux5rf5 grams7enufi7jmdl
drystagepmi5msdm greendrgfjz7ks5f
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4.2 Data collection
In this section, we first introduce the hardware, software, and network setup for the
collection of power traces. We then explain how webpages and Tor circuits are selected.
Finally, we present details on all datasets used in this project.
4.2.1 Experiment Setup
We powered the smartphone using a Rigol DP832 power supply [70]. It was set to 5.5 V
when the smartphone battery was fully charged, and to 9 V when the smartphone battery
was charging from 30%. The latter setting is supported by the Samsung Galaxy S6 and
other smartphones compatible with Qualcomm Quick Charge [71], and resulted in a wider
power consumption dynamic range. As suggested by USB charging specification [72], we
modified the charging circuit so that the data pins (D+ and D ) of the USB cable were
connected using a 200 ⌦ resistor to allow for charging currents above 500 mA. To measure
the instantaneous smartphone power consumption from the USB port, we inserted a 0.1
⌦ shunt resistor on the GND wire of the USB cable, and measured the voltage drop
across the resistor using a National Instruments USB-6211 DAQ [73]. The DAQ was set
to use a sampling rate of 200 kHz.
To collect power traces, we used Orbot and Orfox on two Samsung Galaxy S6 smart-
phones, denoted as phone A and phone B, respectively, in the rest of this project. Orbot
implements a local proxy that provides access to the Tor network. Orfox is a web browser
based on the smartphone version of Firefox. It enhances Firefox by including features
that improve user privacy, such as HTTPS Everywhere [74]. Further, it disables the
execution of JavaScript code by default. We connected Orfox to Tor using the Orbot
instance on the smartphone. To collect data reliably, we modified Orfox by disabling the
Android flag FLAG SECURE to enable screenshot once a web page was loaded. This was
used to manually verify that all pages were loaded successfully. We also implemented a
Tor option that enables manual selection of the second relay, so as to create a “fixed”
Tor circuit.
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To load each webpage automatically, we developed an Android background service
that cycled through our webpage list (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). After loading each webpage,
the service paused for 12 seconds, and then logged the URL that was loaded, together
with the corresponding timestamp.
We loaded all webpages using the WiFi network on the campus of The College of
William & Mary, and via the T-Mobile LTE network in Williamsburg.
4.2.2 Datasets
In this subsection, we introduce Tor hidden service [68]. To collect data, we used two
types of Tor circuits: fixed, and automatic. Details follow.
Collection of Data from Tor Hidden Services In contrast with servers on the public
Internet, Tor hidden services are accessible only using the Tor network. Hidden service
providers reside on Tor relays or Tor clients, and o↵er various services including web
hosting, instant messaging, and SSH, while hiding the hidden service IP addresses. Each
Tor hidden service hides behind several “introduction” relays in the Tor network. When
visiting a hidden service, the Tor client first downloads the service’s public descriptor
(identified by a unique 16-character name followed by “.onion”). Then, it creates a
Tor circuit to a randomly selected “rendezvous” relay, and sends the rendezvous relay’s
address to the hidden service through one introduction relay. The hidden service creates
a Tor circuit to the rendezvous relay, and the client uses the “rendezvous” relay to
exchange encrypted messages with the hidden service.
In this project, we refer to the webpages hosted on public Internet servers as “public
webpage”, and to web content hosted on hidden services as “hidden service”.
We collected power traces while loading selected public webpages and hidden services.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 list all websites used in our experiments. For public webpages, we
selected the home pages of the 50 most popular non-adult websites accessible via Tor,
based on the Alexa ranking. We excluded public webpages that do not display content
without JavaScript, because Orfox disables JavaScript by default. For hidden services,
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we randomly selected 50 websites from The Hidden Wiki [75] that were consistently
available during the experiments. Because 100 webpages represent only a small portion
of the Web, we consider this work as a proof of concept. However, even with this
restriction, our results conclusively show that substantial information is leaked when the
adversary is able to monitor power consumption during page load.
Selection of Tor Circuits
When a Tor client builds a circuit, it first selects three relays from a public directory.
The client then connects to the first relay (“entry”), and uses it to extend the circuit
to the second relay (“middle”). The client finally uses the first two relays to extend the
circuit to the last relay (“exit”). As it constructs the circuit, the client shares a unique
symmetric key with each relay.
We performed our experiments using two types of Tor circuits: “automatic”, and
“fixed”. For automatic circuits, we allowed Orbot to select a new circuit for each webpage
loading using the default path selection protocol [76]. By default, the entry relay is
selected among a small group of long-term entry servers (guard nodes), and it does not
change for a relatively long time. However, Orbot settings allow the user to disable using
entry guard by setting “UseEntryGuards” to 0. We used this option in our experiments
to model the inability of the adversary to use the same Entry Guard as the user.
The circuit used to load a specific webpage changes every 10 minutes by default.
Because in our data collection the time between collection of subsequent traces from
the same webpage is larger than 30 minutes, power traces from the same website were
collected using di↵erent circuits.
With the fixed circuits, we manually chose all three Tor nodes in the circuit, and
used them to load all webpages. In our dataset, we denoted the circuit composed of
anonymiton (in Germany, entry), torfa (in Hungary, middle), and Hermes (in France,
exit) as “Cir-1”. We denoted the following circuit as “Cir-2”: inky (in Switzerland,
entry), cry (in Netherlands, middle), and hessel1 (in Romania, exit). Although in
practice Orbot (or any modern Tor implementation) does not use a fixed circuit for
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loading multiple webpages, we used this type of circuits to evaluate the scenario where
training and testing data were collected under conditions that were as consistent as
possible. This allowed us to quantify the loss of accuracy due to noise induced by the
use of di↵erent Tor circuits in training and testing.
The datasets used in our experiments are listed in Table 4.3. Each dataset is com-
posed of 40 power traces collected from the 100 webpages. Each trace has a duration
of 10 seconds, because this allowed Orfox to load almost all webpages completely. We
loaded all 100 webpages once, and then repeated this process 40 times. If a page did not
load successfully, we replaced that trace with a new one at the end of the data collection
session.
Table 4.3: Configurations used to collect power trace datasets
Dataset Phone Circuit Network Battery Level
1 A Automatic WiFi 100%
2 B Automatic WiFi 100%
3 A Automatic LTE 100%
4 B Automatic WiFi 30% to 50%
5 A Fixed #1 WiFi 100%
6 B Fixed #2 WiFi 100%
71 A Automatic WiFi 100%
8 B Automatic WiFi 100%
4.3 Feature selection and classification
To identify the public webpages and hidden services loaded on the smartphone, we first
extracted time- and frequency-domain features from the power traces, and then trained
a Random Forest classifier on the resulting feature vectors. We used the trained classifier
to predict the webpages on new power traces.
1To minimize the e↵ect of time di↵erence on the identification accuracy when comparing two di↵erent
phones, we collected datasets #7 and #8 under the same scenario as datasets #1 and #2 but with
shorter interval between collections of the two datasets.
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Figure 4.3: Spectrogram analysis on power traces sampled while loading six di↵erent
websites.
4.3.1 Feature selection
We experimented using time-domain features, such as mean, RMS, and correlation coef-
ficient, and frequency-domain features based on cepstrum analysis [77]. We found that
features based on spectrogram analysis led to higher accuracies. Figure 4.3 illustrates
that di↵erent webpages have distinctive frequency spectrum patterns, where the mag-
nitude values in most frequencies are significantly di↵erent among these webpages. We
further divided each power trace into several overlapping 0.5-second segments. We cal-
culated the spectrogram of each segment (using window length of 1000 samples, and
50% overlap between windows). The spectrogram results contain the magnitudes of fre-
quencies in the range of 0 Hz ⇠ 100 kHz. We divided this range into 125 equal-size bins
to reduce the e↵ects of noise of individual frequencies, and calculated the average mag-
nitude of all the frequencies in each bin as its corresponding feature, thus transforming
each power trace segment into a feature vector of 125 elements.
4.3.2 Classification
The classification problem can be abstracted as follows. We use X = (x1, x2, . . . , xp) to
denote a feature vector with p features. Variable Y represents possible classes 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Given a training dataset S with N observations (Xi, Yi), we first use S to train a classifier
Cˆ(X) 2 {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and then use Cˆ(X) to predict the classes of testing feature vectors.
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We used Random Forest for classifier training. A random forest consists of a set of
decision trees. We use B to denote the number of decision trees to build for a random
forest. There are three steps to train the random forest: (1) from dataset S, each time
we randomly draw N observations with replacement to create a bootstrap dataset Sb
for b = 1, 2, . . . , B, (2) from each Sb, we train a decision tree C(Sb, X), and (3) the
random forest classifier is the ensemble of all C(Sb, X), and it uses majority vote to
make prediction on testing feature vectors.
In the following, we give details of the above step (2). Each decision tree is built from
the root node. At each node, we randomly select a subset of all the p features, denoted
by F = {x⇤1, x⇤2, . . . , x⇤m},m = blog2p+ 1c. For each feature x⇤i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we use
Gi to denote the set of all possible x⇤i values in the dataset. We try each possible test
x⇤i < g, g 2 Gi to split the current node, and choose the test that generates the largest
“information gain”. To calculate the information gain, at each node, assuming Pi is the
occurrence probability of class i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K, we first calculate the Shannon entropy
as:
H =  
KX
i=1
 Pi log2 Pi (4.1)
Assume that the entropy at current node is H. After a splitting, there are L percent of
observations in the left child and R percent of observations in the right child. We use HL
and HR to denote the entropy at the left and right child respectively. Then the average
entropy after splitting is:
HAfter = HL ⇥ L+HR ⇥R (4.2)
The information gain of a splitting is defined as (H  HAfter). At each node, our goal
is finding the splitting to:
maximize(H  HAfter) (4.3)
The above process recurses on each child until a stopping condition is satisfied, such as
all observations in the node belong to the same class.
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After all decision trees are trained, the random forest classifier is defined by:
Cˆ(X) = majority vote{C(Sb, X)}, b = 1, 2, . . . , B (4.4)
We used the WEKA [78] implementation of Random Forests. For each of our experi-
ment scenario, we used 20 power traces per webpage to train the classifier, and the other
20 power traces per webpage for testing. We trained the classifier using segments of all
training traces. To identify a testing power trace, we first classified all the segments of
this trace, and then used majority voting of these segments to determine the class of this
trace.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
We first present the identification accuracies of our technique for the baseline scenario
(i.e. using WiFi and fully-charged battery). We then discuss how di↵erent variables,
including using di↵erent phones for training and testing, network types, and battery
charging levels, a↵ect identification accuracy.
4.4.1 Identification Accuracy for Baseline
We list the datasets corresponding to our baseline as #1 and #2 in Table 4.3. We
evaluated the following three cases: (1) using all traces for both public webpages and
hidden services; (2) using traces from public webpages for training and testing; (3) using
traces from hidden services for training and testing. In each case, we used half traces for
training, and the other half for testing. The results are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Webpage identification accuracy using WiFi and 100%-charged battery
(baseline)
Phone All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
A 79.05% 76.3% 87.3%
B 85.7% 82.2% 89.2%
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Figure 4.4: Identification accuracy comparison among (1) hidden services, (2) public
webpages with content changes, and (3) public webpages without content changes.
We were able to identify hidden services with higher accuracy (87.3%) than public
webpages (76.3%), as shown in Figure 4.4. There are two possible reasons for the ac-
curacy di↵erence between public webpages and hidden services. First, we measured the
loading time of six hidden services (shown in Figure 4.5). We observed that, the loading
time of hidden service is more consistent (19.82% relative standard deviation, on average,
compared to 40.54% for public webpages) and has smaller range (from 3.25 s to 10.63 s,
compared to 2.81 s to 23.63 s for public webpages). Possible reasons for these di↵erences
include: (1) hidden services are mostly simple static webpages; and (2) their contents
rarely change over a long time. In contrast, public webpages usually contain large-size
elements. Since public webpages need longer loading time than hidden services, they
have a higher chance of being influenced by the instability of Tor circuits. As a result,
there are more inconsistency and noise in the training and testing power traces of public
webpages.
Second, we examined the screenshots for each webpage loading, and found none of
the 50 hidden services changed their displayed contents during the data collection period
(about 1 day). In comparison, 31 of the 50 public webpages displayed di↵erent contents
during the collection, which further a↵ects the consistency among power traces of public
webpages. Figure 4.4 shows that public webpages without content changes have higher
average accuracy than public webpages with content changes.
The content changes of public webpages are either due to frequent website updates
(e.g. for news websites), or because di↵erent versions of the webpage were loaded based
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Figure 4.5: Loading time for six hidden services using Tor.
on the geographical location of the Tor exit relay. For example, we checked the four
public webpages with identification accuracy lower than 40%, and found two of them
were loaded with di↵erent versions (based on website language, content, and layout):
there were 9 versions for paypal.com (with accuracy of 30%), and three versions for
dropbox.com. (with accuracy of 25%).
To improve the identification accuracy, we tried to use a specific version of these
websites for training and testing. For example, we used the traces for paypal.com/de
instead of paypal.com and re-conducted the whole training and testing. The identifica-
tion accuracy was improved from 30% to 90% for this specific webpage, and increased
from 79.05% to 79.65% for all webpages.
4.4.2 Impact of Phones
When we used the dataset collected from phone A to train the model, and tested the
dataset from phone B, the original classification model didn’t work well and we improved
it in the following way. By examining the spectrograms of power traces from di↵erent
phones, we observed that beyond a specific frequency (about 3 KHz), the di↵erence in
magnitude distribution among spectrograms is more determined by the phone than by
the webpage. Thus we increased the frequency resolution of the spectrogram, and used
the magnitudes of the first 250 frequency points (ranging from 0 Hz to 3039.6 Hz) as
the feature vector for each power trace. We then used Sequential Minimal Optimization
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Figure 4.6: Loading time of public webpages using LTE network.
(SMO) algorithm [79] for model training and testing. The identification accuracies using
two phones are presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Webpage identification accuracy using di↵erent phones for training and
testing
Train Test All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
A B 43.13% 48.75% 47.05%
B A 36.58% 43.2% 40.35%
Even though the accuracy decreases when training and testing on di↵erent smart-
phones (36.58% to 43.13% for all webpages using two phones, compared to 79.05% to
85.7% using the same smartphone for training and testing), it is still significantly higher
than that of random chance at 1%.
4.4.3 Impact of Network Characteristics
In dataset #3, we collected training and testing traces using LTE network. The results
in Table 4.6 show that the identification accuracy when training and testing on LTE
(71.75%) is worse than that when using WiFi (79.05%, see Table 4.4). Consistently
with our experiments based on WiFi, we observed that the accuracy for public webpages
is lower than that of hidden services, and the accuracy decrease for public webpages
(64.8% using LTE, compared to 76.3% using WiFi) is larger than the decrease for hidden
services (78.7% using LTE, compared to 87.3% using WiFi).
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Table 4.6: Webpage identification accuracy using LTE
All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
71.75% 64.8% 78.7%
One possible explanation is that LTE network contributes to additional noise in the
power traces, compared to WiFi. We measured the loading time of six public webpages
using LTE. The results are shown in Figure 4.6. Compared with the results of using
WiFi , the average loading time increased by 9.1%, which indicates that LTE introduced
more unpredictable delays than WiFi.
We also trained the model with WiFi traces, and tested it using LTE traces, and vice
versa. The identification accuracies shown in Table 4.7 are significantly lower than that
when using LTE traces for both training and testing. This indicates that the adversary
needs to train a di↵erent model for each network.
Table 4.7: Cross testing using LTE and WiFi networks
Train Test All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
WiFi LTE 24.55% 24.25% 42.9%
LTE WiFi 21.8% 21% 28.15%
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Figure 4.7: Capped current when smartphone battery is partially charged.
4.4.4 Impact of Battery Charging level
When the smartphone is charging, a large part of power is used to charge the battery.
In contrast, when the battery is fully charged, almost all current from the charger is
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used to power the phone, including loading the webpage. Thus, battery charging level
impacts the amount of information that can be inferred from the power trace on webpage
loading. We collected the power traces for 30% to 50% battery level. Before each round
of the collection, we discharged the phone battery to 30%. Then we shu✏ed the 100
webpages into a random sequence, and collected one trace for each webpage following
this sequence. After collecting all 100 traces in one round, the battery level increased
to about 50%. Then we discharged the battery to 30% again, and repeated the above
collection process. This process was repeated 40 times in total. Dataset #4 includes the
traces collected while the smartphone charging level was between 30% and 50%.
We used half of dataset #4 for training, and the other half for testing. The identifi-
cation results are in Table 4.8. We observed that the accuracy decreases sharply when
the battery is not fully charged. One reason is that the maximum charging current is
capped by an upper limit (1.15 A in this case), which is imposed by the smartphone’s
charging circuit (see Figure 4.7), where 98.17% of the samples in the power trace have
current value below 1.15 A. This limitation distorts the power signals and decreases the
e↵ectiveness of our technique. Further, we found that there were strong noisy signals
periodically appearing in each trace. The same signals did not appear in the power traces
collected when the battery was fully charged.
Table 4.8: Webpage identification accuracy when battery level is from 30% to 50%
All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
36% 34.5% 46%
4.4.5 Impact of Tor Circuits Type
We evaluated the scenario in which training and testing data were collected using the
same fixed circuit. The corresponding datasets are indicated as #5 and #6 in Table 4.3.
Table 4.9 reports the identification accuracies when using fixed circuits “Cir-2” and “Cir-
2” on di↵erent phones. Compared to the results in Table 4.4 obtained using automatic
circuits, accuracies are not significantly higher, or are even lower in some cases. One
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possible explanation is that the throughput of each relay in the fixed circuits are always
changing. This adds unpredictable delays for each webpage loading and increases the
inconsistency between power traces for training and testing. In our experiments, we
observed that during some periods the fixed circuits could not be used to load any
webpages at all. In contrast, automatic circuits are constructed using optimized path
selection protocol. In practice, our experiments show that the adversary should use
automatic circuits to collect training traces.
Table 4.9: Webpage identification accuracy using fixed Tor circuits
Phone Circuit All webpages Public webpage only Hidden service only
A #1 78.1% 79.6% 84.8%
B #2 82.6% 85.7% 86.1%
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we demonstrated a technique based on USB power analysis that allows
a malicious charging station to identify which webpages are loaded on a smartphone
using Tor. To our knowledge, this is the first work to study attacks on Tor based on
smartphone power side-channels.
We validated our attack under realistic smartphone constraints by collecting and
analyzing power traces under several scenarios, including di↵erent networks (WiFi and
LTE), di↵erent devices, and di↵erent battery charging levels.
We correctly identified webpages visited using the o cial mobile Tor browser. We
achieved accuracies between 36.58% and 85.7% when the battery was fully charged, and
between 34.5% and 46% when the battery level was at 30%-50%. In comparison, accuracy
obtained by random website selection is 1% for all websites, and 2% when considering
hidden services or public webpages alone.
We consider this work the first step towards a full characterization of power side-
channel attacks on Tor. As such, there are several variables that were not taken into
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consideration in this work. For instance, future work will include a large webpage dataset
to fully characterize how our technique extend to the entire web. Further, we will
investigate how to to improve the identification accuracy for the scenario when battery
charging level is low.
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Chapter 5
MEG: Memory and Energy
E cient Garbled Circuit
Evaluation On Smartphones
5.1 Introduction
Secure computation is the process of multiple parties computing the value of a function
without involving any outside parties. To protect the privacy of computation partici-
pants, the input of each party can not be leaked to any other parties. Secure compu-
tation has wide usage in areas such as electronic voting [80], privacy-preserving data
mining [81], and biometric-based authentication [49], [82]. As various Internet-of-things
(IoT) devices are increasingly being deployed, their users’ privacy can also be protected
by secure computation. For example, when an IoT device is part of a crowdsourcing
system and it needs to exchange private data with other parties, secure computation can
be used to prevent the IoT device from losing data privacy to malicious parties, while
still allowing it to exchange data with other crowdsourcing participants and obtain the
final computation results [83], [84].
When there are two parties involved in secure computation, garbled circuit proto-
col [85] is a popular solution. The idea of garbled circuit is that one party (“generator”)
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transforms a function into a boolean circuit composed of wired binary gates, and then
“garbles” this circuit by assigning encryption keys to represent possible values (0 or
1) at each wire. The circuit generator sends the garbled circuit, as well as its garbled
input, to the other party (“evaluator”). The evaluator computes the output keys and
then decodes the function output. When considering practical functions to evaluate, the
generated garbled circuits usually contain a large amount of circuit gates. For exam-
ple, in this work we need more than 30,000 gates to implement AES and more than 9
million gates to compute edit distance using garbled circuit. Therefore, the circuit eval-
uation process requires substantial data transmission and computation workload, which
causes significant memory and energy consumption on the circuit evaluation device. On
resource-limited mobile devices, such as smartphones and IoT devices with small RAM
capacity, low CPU performance, and short battery life, garbled circuit evaluation has
only become practical in recent years [45]. To increase the scalability of garbled circuit
evaluation on mobile devices, it is crucial to improve the memory and energy e ciency.
When considering the method of data transmission between the circuit generator
and the evaluator, existing garbled circuit solutions can be grouped into two types: (1)
non-pipelining, and (2) pipelining. In the non-pipelining method, the evaluator stores
the entire garbled circuit in its memory before evaluation. Because the transmission
size of garbled circuits can be very huge for practical functions, non-pipelining method
brings high memory overhead because all the transmitted data need to be stored in the
RAM. In the pipelining method ([90], [91], [92], [42]), the generator sends each garbled
gate as soon as possible. The evaluator only needs to keep one received gate, and deletes
it from the memory as soon as it’s evaluated. As a result, the evaluator only needs a
small size of memory to store the current gate for evaluation. However, the pipelining
method consumes more energy than the non-pipelining method (as shown in Section 5.4),
because there are continuous data transmission and computation across the whole circuit
evaluation process, which prevents the processor and network interface (such as WiFi
module) to enter power saving state. On the contrary, non-pipelining method allows
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the CPU to enter low power state during the data receiving process, and it enables the
network interface to enter power saving mode during the circuit computation.
Contributions. In this work, we propose M emory and Energy e cient Garbled
(MEG) circuit evaluation method , which manages to combine the advantages of both
non-pipelining (low energy consumption) and pipelining (low memory overhead) meth-
ods. The basic idea of MEG is to finish a middle ground between current techniques that
o↵ers the benefits of both. Specifically, MEG utilizes batch transmission of the circuit
gates and multi-threading execution of gates transmission and calculation. In this way,
MEG saves memory usage by only storing the current batch of gates. MEG also reduces
energy consumption because it enables WiFi to enter power saving mode between two
consecutive bursts of data transmission. To our best knowledge, we are the first to apply
batching technique in garbled circuit evaluation for memory and energy e ciency.
We implemented MEG on smartphone (as circuit evaluator) as well as on PC (as cir-
cuit generator). We evaluated MEG using various burst sizes and compared its memory
and energy consumption with existing circuit evaluation methods. We also compared
the single-thread and multi-thread implementations of MEG. For memory consumption,
MEG uses a fixed amount of memory regardless of the size of the circuit, which is just
slightly above the pipelined version. For energy consumption, our evaluation results
show that MEG consumes up to 42.1% less energy than the pipelining method and is
close to the non-pipelining method. MEG also significantly reduces up to 56.7% running
time compared to the pipelining method.
Security model. We assume both parties (generator and evaluator) in MEG are
possibly malicious adversaries, who would arbitrarily violate the protocol to get other
parties’ information. Malicious generator could generates garbled circuit that can be used
to get the evaluator’s input. The security of MEG is the same as that of the underlying
garbled circuit protocol. Because MEG is built on the cut-and-choose method [44], which
garbles multiple copies of the same function to defend malicious circuit generation, it is
secure against malicious adversaries.
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Figure 5.1: Basic garbled circuit evaluation process
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we give details about
garbled circuit protocol and the problem of existing implementations. In Section 5.3, we
propose the system design of MEG. In Section 5.4, we present the evaluation of MEG
on smartphones. We conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 Background and Motivation
In this section, We first give details about garbled circuit evaluation, then present two
di↵erent evaluation methods: non-pipelining and pipelining. We explain the problems
of current methods concerning memory and energy consumption.
5.2.1 Basic Procedure of Garbled Circuit Protocol
In garbled circuit protocol, there are two communication parties: circuit generator (Al-
ice) and evaluator (Bob). Given a function f , Alice has input x1, and Bob has input x2.
They want to compute the function result f(x1, x2) only by themselves, without letting
Alice know x2 or Bob know x1. The basic garbled circuit protocol uses the following six
steps to calculate f(x1, x2), as shown in Figure 5.1.
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1. Alice represents the function f into a boolean circuit cf , which only consists
of binary gates (e.g. AND, OR, and XOR). Each gate is represented by a truth table
consisting of four entries. Every entry describes the possible boolean values for the gate’s
two input wires (input columns) and one output wire (output column).
2. Alice turns circuit cf into a “garbled” version cg in the following way. Gate by gate,
Alice generates an encryption key for each possible value of each input or output wire,
and then encrypts the output column of each truth table entry using the corresponding
input wire keys. Alice also re-orders all the entries in the garbled truth table.
3. Alice garbles her boolean value input x to xg by converting each bit of x into the
encryption key of the corresponding input wire defined in the garbled circuit cg.
4. Alice sends the garbled circuit cg and its garbled input xg to Bob.
5. Alice and Bob run oblivious transfer protocol [88], so that Bob receives the garbled
version yg of his own input y, without disclosing y to Alice.
6. Bob evaluates each gate by using the two input keys he learned to compute the
output keys. Bob decodes the final output keys into the corresponding bit value, and
sends back the evaluation result to Alice.
There are several existing performance optimization methods for the above proto-
col. When constructing the garbled circuit, free-XOR technique [40] allows XOR gates
to be evaluated without using the corresponding garbled tables or the cryptographic
operations, thus eliminating some overhead for data transmission and processing. Fur-
thermore, garbled row deduction [41] helps to reduce the size of each gate truth table by
one entry, thus the communication and computation cost of circuit evaluation is further
reduced.
To be secure against malicious adversaries, cut-and-choose method [44] can be used
to enhance the basic garbled circuit protocol. The ideas of cut-and choose is as follows.
First, the generator constructs multiple garbled versions of the circuit, and the evaluator
randomly selects a set of the circuits (named “check circuits”), and challenges the gener-
ator to prove these circuits are validly garbled. If no malicious garbling is found within
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Figure 5.2: Power traces of non-pipelining vs. pipelining garbled circuit evaluation
process on smartphone. The traces between “Start” and “End” are for circuit evaluation.
The circuit is to compute 256-bit edit distance.
the check-circuits, the evaluator will evaluate the remaining unchecked circuits (named
“evaluation circuits”), and use the majority of the evaluation results as the final output.
5.2.2 Pipelining Method
In “non-pipelined” implementations of garbled circuit (such as [89]), the circuit evalua-
tion does not begin until the whole circuit is loaded into the evaluator’s memory. This
implementation method brings significant memory overhead to the evaluation device,
especially for mobile devices with limited memory capacity. It also severely impacts
the scalability of garbled circuit evaluation, because many practical functions requires
garbled circuits of large size. The problem with large size is that the circuit has to fit in
memory.
Pipelining evaluation method was proposed to solve the memory overhead problem.
The premise of pipelining method is that there is no need to store the entire circuit in the
RAM of the evaluator. Instead, the generation and evaluation of garbled gates can be
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Figure 5.3: Workflows of single-thread and multi-thread versions of MEG.
pipelined (i.e. overlapped in time). When the evaluator receives one gabled gate, it finds
the corresponding gate of the circuit and begins to evaluate it as soon as the necessary
inputs become ready. Gates already evaluated will be deleted from the memory. As a
result, pipelining method significantly decreases the memory consumption from as large
as hundreds of megabytes to only several bytes (determined by the size of one gate).
5.2.3 Energy Cost of Pipelining
Despite of the advantage of memory e ciency , pipelining evaluation consumes more
energy than the non-pipelining method. This problem arises from the continuous data
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reception and computation activities across the whole pipelined circuit evaluation pro-
cess, which keeps both the CPU and the network interface in high power state most of
the time. On the contrary, in non-pipelined circuit evaluation each phase (OT, sending
circuit, evaluating the circuit) is performed at di↵erent times, and therefore the resources
used at a particular time are used 100%, and are o↵ during the other times. As a result,
non-pipelining method enables the CPU enter low power state during the data trans-
mission intensive period, and the network device enter power saving mode during the
computation intensive process. For example, Figure 5.2 presents the power traces when
using non-pipelining and pipelining method respectively to evaluate the garbled circuit
for 256-bit edit distance calculation. We found that the average power consumption
when using pipelining method (2376.89 mW minus baseline) is 30.6% larger than using
non-pipelining method (1988.75 mW minus baseline). We also observed that pipelined
method takes more time than non-pipelined. One reason is when the cpu is done eval-
uating one gate, it needs to request and wait for the next one, thus increases the total
time due to process switching and network delay. As a result, the energy consumption
using the pipelining method is 32% higher than using the non-pipelining method.
5.3 Design of MEG
Three techniques are used in the design of MEG: gates batching, slow start, and multi-
threading.
5.3.1 Gates batching and burst transmission
The idea of gates batching is that the circuit generator does not immediately send each
generated garbled gate, but stores it to a bu↵er in the memory. Once the bu↵er size
reaches a pre-set value (burst size), the generator sends the batch of gates in the bu↵er
as a transmission burst to the evaluator. On the evaluator side, it also keeps a memory
bu↵er to store the incoming batch of gates. After a batch of gates are received, the
evaluator evaluates these gates and deletes them from the memory once the evaluation
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is completed. Gates batching brings two advantages. First, because the bu↵er size
is fixed and it does not depend on the size of the circuit, the memory consumption
for circuit evaluation could be significantly reduced. Second, burst transmission saves
energy consumption, because it allows the CPU to enter low power mode during the
transmission of each batch, and the network interface enter power saving mode during
circuit computation.
5.3.2 Multi-threading
In existing implementations of garbled circuit on smartphones (such as [42]), the gener-
ator only uses a single thread to process both generation and sending of the gates. On
the other side, the evaluator also only creates one thread to handle both receiving and
calculation of the gates. Figure 5.3a presents the single-thread version of MEG. The
problem of using single-thread is that even some operations (such as date transmission
and calculation) could run in parallel, they are forced to run in sequence within the
same thread. As a result, for a circuit generator using the single-thread method, gates
transmission needs to wait for gates generation to finish, and then gates generation will
be paused until all bu↵ered gates are sent to the evaluator. The single-thread circuit
evaluator has the same problem, which introduces unnecessary process waiting time and
increases the total execution time of circuit evaluation.
Because most smartphones use multi-core CPUs [93] and enable multi-thread pro-
cessing, we designed a multi-thread version of MEG as shown in Figure 5.3b. Both the
circuit generator and the evaluator create two threads. On the generator, one thread
is used for gates generation, and the other thread is for batched gates transmission.
These two threads use two signals (GATES READY and GATES SENT) to notify each
other about current running status and synchronize. On the evaluator, one thread is
used for gates receiving, and the other is for gates evaluation. They also use two signals
(GATES RECEIVED and GATES PROCESSED) to synchronize. After evaluating the
current batch of gates, the evaluator doesn’t need to pause and wait for receiving a new
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batch from the generator, thus decreasing the total time of circuit evaluation.
5.3.3 Slow Start
We uses slow start to further reduce the circuit evaluation time when using multi-thread
MEG. When receiving batched gates, one problem is that when the batch size is large
(e.g. 16 MB), the evaluator will experience long waiting duration for the first batch of
data. For example, the waiting time for the first batch of 16 MB data is more than 5 s
when using the average mobile internet download speed in US. Inspired by the slow-start
technique in TCP protocol, we used a similar method to control the sizes of the first
several batches. We set the initial batch size to be 0.25 MB and doubled it for each
following batch, until it reaches the pre-set size. For example, if the batch size is 16 MB,
then the sizes of the begining batches are {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 16...} MB in sequence.
In this way, the evaluator only needs to wait for about 0.1 s (still using 22.7 Mbps as
the transmission speed) for the first batch of gates.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the energy consumption and performance of MEG using a
smartphone as evaluator. We also compared MEG with existing approaches.
5.4.1 Methods to compare
We compared the performance of the following garbled circuit evaluation methods:
(1) Non-pipelining : the circuit generator transmits the whole garbled circuit to the
evaluator before evaluation begins.
(2) Pipelining. The evaluator only transmits one gate each time to the evaluator,
and the evaluator beings to evaluate this gate as soon as inputs are available.
(3) Pipelining+. This is our improved pipelining implementation, which removes the
useless 4-byte field containing the packet length in each data packet for one gate.
(4) Single-thread MEG. This is the single-thread implementation of MEG.
62
Table 5.1: Information of evaluated circuits
Circuit function
AES-128 EDT-256
Total number of binary gates 34,136 9,959,904
Total circuit size 343.83 KB 80.27 MB
Number of evaluation-circuits for cut-and-choose 60 1
Total transmission Size 20.63 MB 80.27 MB
(5) Multi-thread MEG. This is the multi-thread version of MEG.
For both single-thread MEG and multi-thread MEG, we considered six di↵erent burst
sizes in bytes: 0.5M, 1M, 2M, 4M, 8M, and 16M.
5.4.2 Experiment setting
The smartphone we used as circuit evaluator is a Samsung Galaxy S4 running Android
5.0. It has a Qualcomm Snapdragon 1.9GHz 4-core processor and 2GB RAM. For
the circuit generator, we used a Thinkpad T440p PC with Intel i7 quad-core 2.4GHz
CPU and 12GB RAM, and it runs Ubuntu 16.04. We created a controlled 802.11n
WiFi network using a Netgear WNDR3700v2 router as the access point. Both the the
smartphone (evaluator) and the PC (generator) connect to this access point through
WiFi.
We used a Monsoon Power Monitor [94] to measure the power trace of the smart-
phone. The smartphone is powered totally by the Power Monitor instead of its own
battery. The Power Monitor logs the power data it outputs to the smartphone in 5
KHz frequency. We analyzed the power trace o✏ine to get both the time stamps (with
resolution of 1 ms) and the power consumption at each time point (in mW), from which
we calculated the total energy consumption for each power trace.
5.4.3 Circuits
We evaluated MEG on two circuits: (1) AES-128 for AES encryption, where the gener-
ator’s input is a 128-bit key (Ek) and the evaluator’s input is a 128-bit block to encrypt
using Ek, and (2) EDT-256 for edit distance calculation, where the input of both the gen-
erator and the evaluator is a 256-bit binary string, respectively. The detailed information
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of each circuit is shown in Table 5.1.
When using cut-and-choose, the total number of evaluation-circuits copies is 60 for
AES-128 and 1 for EDT-256. As a result, the total transmitted circuit data size is 20.63
MB for AES-128, and 80.27 MB for EDT-256.
We implemented the five garbled circuits methods based on the code of Kreuter et
al. [43] , which already implement pipelining circuit evaluation (including codes for obliv-
ious transfer and cut-and-choose). We added implementations of gates batching, slow
start, and both single-thread and multi-thread MEG. The circuit generator implemen-
tation on PC is written in C++, and the evaluator implementation on the smartphone
uses Android NDK to encapsulate the C++ code.
For both AES-128 and EDT-256, we reported the energy consumption and elapsed
time on the smartphone using di↵erent evaluation methods. To get the net energy con-
sumption for circuit evaluation, we measured the average power consumption of the
smartphone while idle to calculate the background energy consumption, and then sub-
tracted the background energy value from the total energy consumption. Due to the
low variance between experiments, we carried out 5 measurements for each circuit type
and evaluation method combination (for single-thread or multi-thread MEG, we also
measured with di↵erent burst sizes).
5.4.4 Results
In the following sections, we compare the energy and memory consumption, as well as
execution time of MEG with other methods.
5.4.4.1 Energy consumption
The energy consumption of all five methods are shown in Figure 5.4. The energy saving or
overhead of MEG compared with other methods are listed in Table 5.2. We observe that
compared to Pipelined method, MEG reduces the energy consumption by 35% to 42%
for AES-128, and by 18% to 23% for EDT-256, respectively. Compared to Pipelined+,
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Figure 5.4: Energy consumption of MEG with di↵erent burst sizes, in comparison with
other methods.
Table 5.2: Energy consumption saving of MEG compared with Pipelined and
Pipelined+, and overhead compared with Non-Pipelined
(a) AES-128
Single-thread MEG Multi-thread MEG
Burst Size (MB) Burst Size (MB)
0.5 1 2 4 8 16 0.5 1 2 4 8 16
Pipelined -35% -38% -39% -39% -40% -42% -35% -35% -38% -38% -39% -38%
Pipelined+ -20% -23% -25% -25% -26% -28% -19% -19% -23% -23% -24% -23%
Non-Pipelined 12% 8% 5% 6% 4% 1% 14% 13% 8% 8% 6% 7%
(b) EDT-256
Single-thread MEG Multi-thread MEG
Burst Size (MB) Burst Size (MB)
0.5 1 2 4 8 16 0.5 1 2 4 8 16
Pipelined -18% -20% -21% -22% -22% -23% -18% -21% -22% -22% -22% -23%
Pipelined+ -8% -10% -11% -12% -13% -14% -8% -11% -13% -13% -12% -13%
Non-Pipelined 8% 5% 5% 3% 3% 1% 8% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2%
MEG decreases the energy consumption by 19% to 28% for AES-128, and by 8% to 14%
for EDT-256, respectively.
When the burst size increases to above 2 MB, the energy consumption of MEG is
very close to that of Non-Pipelined method, with only 1% to 8% overhead for AES-128,
and 1% to 5% overhead for EDT-256.
We also observe that single-thread MEG and multi-thread MEG have close energy
consumption. When the burst size increases, the energy consumption of both versions
of MEG has a slight decreasing trend.
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5.4.4.2 Memory consumption
The memory consumption of MEG is determined by the burst size, which ranges from
0.5 MB to 16 MB in our evaluation. Compared to the non-pipelined method that needs
to store the whole circuit of large size (e.g. EDT-256) in memory, MEG significantly
decreases the memory requirement. For example, based on the energy consumption
evaluation, MEG can achieve satisfactory energy e ciency using 2 MB as the burst size.
Compared with the non-pipelined method, MEG decreases the memory consumption by
97.5% (from 80.27 MB to 2 MB) for EDT-256. This shows that it is possible to obtain
a substantial decrease in memory requirements compared to the non-pipelined method,
while incurring in a negligible increase in energy consumption.
5.4.4.3 Execution Time
The execution time for circuit evaluation of all five methods are shown in Figure 5.5.
We observe that the execution time for multi-thread MEG is consistent across all the
di↵erent burst sizes. For AES-128, multi-thread MEG needs less time than all other
methods: 56.7% decrease to Pipelined, 25.8% decrease to Non-Pipelined, and 19.8%
decrease to Pipelined+. For EDT-256, multi-thread MEG decreases the evaluation time
by 13.5% compared to Pipelined, by 12.6% compared to Non-Pipelined, and is very close
to the lowest time achieved by Pipelined+ (with only 1.5% overhead). This indicates
multi-thread MEG can e↵ectively reduce the execution time.
On the contrary, the execution time of single-thread MEG increases significantly
when the burst size becomes larger. When the burst size increases from 1 MB to 2 MB
and beyond, the execution time of single-thread MEG increases by 21.6% to 31.5% for
AES-128, and by 3.8% to 8.4% for EDT-256. As a result, single-thread MEG takes longer
time than multi-thread MEG, with increments of 21.9% to 31.9% for AES-128, and 3.9%
to 8.3% for EDT-256. Therefore multi-thread MEG has advantages in execution time
compared to single-thread MEG.
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Figure 5.5: Execution time of MEG with di↵erent burst sizes, in comparison with other
methods.
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Power (mW)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 D
at
a
Multi-thread MEG
Single-thread MEG
Pipelined
Non-Pipelined
Pipelined+
(a) AES-128
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Power (mW)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 D
at
a
Multi-thread MEG
Single-thread MEG
Pipelined
Non-Pipelined
Pipelined+
(b) EDT-256
Figure 5.6: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of power consumption
during circuit evaluation. The burst size for MEG is 2 MB.
5.4.5 Discussion
5.4.5.1 Reason for energy reduction by MEG
The advantage of MEG in energy e ciency is because it allows the CPU and network
interface to enter power saving mode when each has low workload. Figure 5.6 present the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of power consumption values during the circuit
evaluation for AES-128 and EDT-256, respectively. We observe that compared to both
Pipelined and Pipelined+, MEG reduces the time spent in high power state while takes
similar time in low power state, thus it reduces the total energy consumption.
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5.4.5.2 Reason for execution time di↵erent between single-thread MEG and
multi-thread MEG
We also observe that multi-thread MEG reduces the total elapsed time than single-
thread MEG when the burst size is above 2 MB. The reason is illustrated in Figure 5.2,
which shows the power traces of using single-thread and multi-thread MEG to evaluate
EDT-256 using 16 MB burst size. For single-thread MEG, there are periodical power
consumption decreasing periods. These decreases occur at the same time when the
evaluation of currently received gates is finished, and the evaluator is waiting for the
new batch of gates to be completely transmitted. In contrast, there are no such power
decreases in the multi-thread MEG traces, because the gates evaluation thread does not
need to pause and wait for the gates receiving thread to finish, which reduces the circuit
evaluation time compared with the single-thread MEG.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we present a memory- and energy-e cient garbled circuit evaluation mech-
anism (MEG) on smartphones. The main techniques used by MEG are batch data
transmission, multi-threading execution, and slow-start strategy. Our experiment results
show that MEG combines the advantages of non-pipelined method for energy e ciency
and pipelined method for memory saving. Compared to the non-pipelined method, MEG
reduces memory consumption by 97.5% for EDT-256 when the batch size is 2 MB. For
energy consumption, compared to the pipelined method, MEG brings reductions of up to
42% for AES-128 and up to 23% for EDT-256. MEG only has a minimal energy overhead
(1% to 8%) compared to the non-pipelined method. Compared to both the pipelined
and non-pipelined methods, the multi-threading implementation of MEG significantly
reduces the circuit evaluation time on smartphones.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we propose solutions to enhance energy e ciency and privacy pro-
tection on smart devices.
First, we demonstrated that it is possible to accurately infer browsing activity on
a smartphone using USB power consumption measurements. Our work is the first to
study this side-channel attack on smartphones, and to analyze a multitude of factors that
a↵ect the traces that are collected during the attack, such as: battery charging level,
user interaction with the touchscreen, trace length, time between collection of training
and testing traces, WiFi and LTE connectivity, training and testing device mismatch,
and website characteristics such as type of connection (HTTP or HTTPS) and location
of the host serving the webpage relative to the smartphone. We performed extensive
experiments to validate our approach. Our results show that the attack successfully
identifies webpages loaded using the standard Android mobile browser at least 91.7% of
the times within four seconds for the automated dataset. Overall, our results show that
the attack is highly e↵ective, because webpage loading generates power signatures that
are distinctive and consistent.
Second, we demonstrated a technique based on USB power analysis that allows a
malicious charging station to identify which webpages are loaded on a smartphone using
Tor. To our knowledge, this is the first work to study attacks on Tor based on smartphone
power side-channels. We validated our attack under realistic smartphone constraints
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by collecting and analyzing power traces under several scenarios, including di↵erent
networks, di↵erent devices, and di↵erent battery charging levels. We correctly identified
webpages visited using the o cial mobile Tor browser. We achieved accuracies between
36.58% and 85.7% when the battery was fully charged, and between 34.5% and 46%
when the battery level was at 30%-50%.
Third, we proposed memory and energy e cient garbled circuit evaluation (MEG) on
smartphones. We evaluated MEG using di↵erent burst size and compared it with existing
circuit evaluation methods. The evaluation results show that the energy consumption of
MEG is significantly lower than the current pipelining schemes and close to that of the
no-pipelining method. MEG also reduces the evaluation time significantly compared to
the basic pipelining. We also evaluated two versions of MEG: single-threaded, and multi-
threaded. We found that the energy consumption of multi-thread and single-thread MEG
is close, but the execution time using multi-thread MEG is shorter and more consistent
than using single-thread MEG.
As future work, we would like to study multitude of factors that we did not address
in this paper, such as number of applications installed on the smartphone, background
processes, network congestion, WiFi/LTE signal strength, and specific user interaction.
We will also include a large webpage dataset to fully characterize how our technique
extend to the entire web. Further, we will investigate how to improve the identification
accuracy for the scenario when battery charging level is low. For the work of MEG, we
will investigate the performance of MEG on more garbled circuits, smartphones, and
network types. We will also create a model to select the best burst size based on factors
such as the circuit size, the run-time status of the smartphone (such as CPU load and
available RAM quantity), as well as network condition.
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